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CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY AND THE
PROGRESSION OF PUNISHMENT
Robert J. Smith† & Zoë Robinson‡
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment has long been interpreted by scholars and judges
to provide very limited protections for criminal defendants.
This understanding of the Eighth Amendment claims that the
prohibition is operationalized mostly to prevent torturous
methods of punishment or halt the isolated use of a punish-
ment practice that has fallen into long-term disuse.
This Article challenges these assumptions.  It argues that
while this limited view of the Eighth Amendment may be accu-
rate as a historical matter, over the past two decades, the
Supreme Court has incrementally broadened the scope of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.  The Court’s contempo-
rary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—with its focus on cate-
gorical exemptions and increasingly nuanced measures of
determining constitutionally excessive punishments—reflects
an overt recognition that the fundamental purpose of the
Eighth Amendment is to protect vulnerable citizens uniquely
subject to majoritarian retributive excess.
Animating these developments is a conception of constitu-
tional liberty that transcends the prohibition on cruel and unu-
sual punishment.  Indeed, 2015’s same-sex marriage
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, reflects a similar trajectory in
the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.  Taken to-
gether, these doctrinal developments illustrate a concerted
move to insert the Court as the independent arbiter of legisla-
tive excesses that undermine the basic right to human dignity
by virtue of unnecessarily impinging upon individual liberty.
Ultimately, these liberty-driven developments signal new pos-
sibilities for the protection of defendant rights in a variety of
contemporary contexts, including juvenile life without parole
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for homicide offenses, life without parole for non-violent drug
offenses, the death penalty, certain mandatory minimum
sentences, and the prolonged use of solitary confinement.
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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment is widely thought of as providing remarkably lim-
ited protections for criminal defendants.1  This understanding
of the Eighth Amendment claims that the prohibition is opera-
tionalized mainly as a mechanism for protecting against tortur-
ous modes of punishment unlikely to be authorized in a
constitutional democracy,2 or as a means of securing a coup de
grace when a punishment practice has fallen into disuse.3
This Article challenges these assumptions.  It argues that
while it is accurate to claim that the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment has historically been limited in its
utility for criminal defendants, as a matter of modern Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the description falls short.  In-
stead, as this Article claims, over the past two decades the
Supreme Court—with Justice Anthony Kennedy at the helm—
has incrementally moved Eighth Amendment doctrine toward a
1 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (2009) (noting that in a recent year “more than one million adults
received noncapital sentences versus 115 people who received death sentences,”
yet “[t]he Court has focused on the tiny percent of cases” and “ignored the rest”);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1061 (2004) (“The bottom line . . . is that there is little in the way of proportionality
review for prison sentences.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Pun-
ishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 360 (1995) (concluding “with gloomy irony, that
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence . . . not only has failed to
meet its purported goal of rationalizing the imposition of the death penalty, but
also may have helped to stabilize and entrench the practice of capital punishment
in the United States”).
2 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991) (“The early
commentary on the Clause contains no reference to disproportionate or excessive
sentences, and again indicates that it was designed to outlaw particular modes of
punishment.”); id. at 985 (concluding that “those who framed and approved the
Federal Constitution chose, for whatever reason, not to include within it the
guarantee against disproportionate sentences”); id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does contain a “narrow” proportion-
ality principle).
3 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 539 (2014) (“[T]he death penalty could be declared
unconstitutional consistent with the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause if it were to fall out of usage long enough that a ‘tradition’ or
‘custom’ of desuetude developed against it.  Such non-usage would have to last
several generations to be considered a reliable measure of constitutionality.”);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (invalidating the death penalty
where Georgia was “the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time
that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman”).
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fundamentally robust protection that has at its core the protec-
tion of the liberty interests of criminal defendants.4
Rather than focusing on the more limited case-specific pro-
portionality analysis or the assessment of “super due process”
procedural rights, two approaches which previously exempli-
fied that Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,5 the
Court’s modern doctrine reflects an increasingly nuanced un-
derstanding of modern politics, and its consequent impact on
criminal defendants.  In doing so, the Court has moved to a
regime where the individual defendants are secondary to a
more generalized consideration of the penological purpose of
any given punishment practice vis-à-vis any given class of of-
fenders or category of offenses.6  Further, in measuring the
penological purpose of a punishment practice, the Court has
additionally shaped a sophisticated and functional rubric for
assessing contemporary standards of decency.
Driving the Court’s jurisprudential shift is an overt recog-
nition of the peculiarly vulnerable nature of the population that
the Eighth Amendment is designed to protect, namely criminal
defendants.7  The Court’s recent jurisprudence reflects a
4 See infra Part II.
5 The procedural regulation approach, which is an attempt to manage the
capital trial process in the hope of eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory out-
comes, is best exemplified by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting claims that “the capital-sentencing procedures adopted by
Georgia in response to Furman do not eliminate the dangers of arbitrariness and
caprice in jury sentencing”), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980)
(invalidating one of the statutory aggravating factors—that the crime was “outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” because it was too vague to meet
the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of “rationally reviewable . . . process” in
capital cases).  The case-specific proportionality approach, which considers
whether a sentence is cruel and unusual as applied to a particular person, is best
exemplified by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding unconstitutional
a sentence of life imprisonment for the passing of a bad check by a convicted felon)
and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18 (2003) (affirming a sentence of 25 years
to life upon a non-violent recidivist offenders who stole “three golf clubs, priced at
$399 apiece, concealed in his pants leg”).  For a robust discussion of these
strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 126–32 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Court’s procedural regulation under the Eighth
Amendment); infra notes 139–53 (discussing the Court’s case-by-case proportion-
ality approach under the Eighth Amendment).
6 See infra notes 154–205 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisdiction).
7 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938)
(“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that, especially in times of public panic over real or perceived crime
spikes, “[t]hose whom we would banish from society or from the human commu-
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deeper understanding of the impact that unchecked legisla-
tures can have on the most unpopular members of our consti-
tutional community.  As Justice Kennedy recently
underscored, “fundamental rights may not be submitted to a
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”8
Concerns over majoritarian excess are not new.9  The con-
stitutional Framers recognized the potential for a majority of
the community to impose on the minority.  James Madison
famously noted in Federalist Paper No. 51 that
[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. . . . If
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure.10
The Court has noted the role of the Bill of Rights in protecting
against these very concerns, commenting that “[t]he very pur-
pose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts.”11
Yet, as the latter half of the last century evidences, con-
cerns about majoritarianism are amplified in the context of
criminal defendants.  The United States’ prison population
skyrocketed in the 1980s and 90s,12 and now the nation incar-
cerates more of its citizens than any other country in the
world.13  This flood of criminal defendants is attributable to
retributive excess as a direct result of a series of moral panic
events, whereby the public reacts to a real or perceived crime
nity itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s demand for
punishment.  It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the Consti-
tution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions
of social life.”).
8 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
9 For a thorough overview of the majoritarian difficulty and its many aca-
demic commentators, see generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 112 YALE L.J. 153,
176–215 (2002) (criticizing academic characterizations of the Court as a counter-
majoritarian institution).
10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
11 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
12 See JUSTICE POL’Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT
THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000).
13 Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RESEARCH,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate
[https://perma.cc/WD5M-93H9].
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problem in a way that is hysterical and out-of-all-proportion.14
Legislators, in turn, pass harsh sentences to address these
public concerns, but when the panic fades the reality of exces-
siveness in punishment sets in.15  And while contemporary leg-
islators and executive officials work to undo some of the
retributive excesses of the decades prior,16 if there is any lesson
from the past half century, it is that it is implausible to rely
solely on legislators to get the retributive calculus of punish-
ment right.  Further, the punitiveness of the public mood—
and, therefore, political action—can shift rapidly from rights-
protective to retributive.17
Until recently, the judiciary has remained on the sidelines,
unable or unwilling to act as a majoritarian counterweight to
provide robust protections for the rights of criminal defend-
ants.18  Constrained by the previously limited scope of the
Eighth Amendment, many judges have been at a loss to know
how to respond to continued legislative excess.  For example, in
2015, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a mandatory life
without parole sentence for marijuana possession imposed
upon a seventy-six-year-old disabled combat veteran.19  Chief
Justice Roy Moore called the punishment “excessive and un-
justified,”20 and urged the legislature to wrestle with the “grave
flaws in our statutory sentencing scheme”21 and consider
whether such punishment “serves an appropriate purpose.”22
This Article claims that the Court’s evolving Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence overtly recognizes these deep and intracta-
14 See infra notes 30–96 and accompanying text (discussing moral panic and
retributive excess).
15 Id.
16 Consider, for example, that both Senator Ted Cruz (R) and Senator Corey
Booker (D) recently co-sponsored the Smarter Sentencing Act, which would re-
duce draconian mandatory minimum sentences. See Lydia Wheeler, Bipartisan
Bill Would Ease Drug Sentences, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://thehill.
com/regulation/232670-bill-targets-prison-population-through-non-violent-
drug-crimes [https://perma.cc/JS6P-BUC8].  Further, President Obama an-
nounced clemency in 2015 for dozens of non-violent offenders. See Matt Ford,
Obama’s Christmas Clemency Cavalcade, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/obama-pardons-clemency/42
1317/ [https://perma.cc/G66F-6TQD].
17 See infra notes 30–96 and accompanying text (discussing moral panic and
retributive excess).
18 See infra notes 97–125 and accompanying text (discussing the historic and
contemporary role of the judiciary in enforcing Eighth Amendment rights).
19 Ex parte Lee Carroll Brooker, No. 1141160, slip op. at 2 (Ala. 2015) (Moore,
J., concurring).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id.
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ble concerns about majoritarian retributive excess.  Tracing the
Court’s jurisprudence over the past two decades, the Article
demonstrates the Court’s gradual shift away from a narrow
and wooden Eighth Amendment framework to one that em-
braces the role of the judiciary as an independent arbiter of
excessive punishment.  The doctrine evidences a carefully mea-
sured renunciation of concerns over the randomness of pun-
ishment toward a more holistic consideration of proportionality
(i.e. the fit between the culpability of the defendant and the
purpose of the punishment).23  At the level of application, this
has resulted in a burgeoning categorical exemption jurispru-
dence as well as an increasingly nuanced measure of the con-
ception of constitutionally excessive punishments.24
Animating the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudential
shift is the evolving concept of constitutional liberty, a funda-
mental constitutional value that Justice Kennedy describes as
being based in a “spacious phrase” in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which creates, “a zone of protection, a line that is
drawn where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond
this line you may not go.”25  According to Justice Kennedy, this
value of constitutional liberty includes “certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity.”26  This conception of constitutional liberty as
driving the scope of constitutional rights is not limited to the
Eighth Amendment.  Instead, constitutional liberty has begun
to permeate the Court’s jurisprudence in other areas, most
recently and notably in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process jurisprudence, at least as it relates to
gay rights.27  In its seminal 2015 decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges, the Court emphasized the driving force of liberty in
determining the content of the substantive due process right.28
The development of Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty,
23 See infra notes 126–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
shift toward categorical exemptions to strike down excessive punishment
practices).
24 See infra notes 169–205 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
Court’s embrace of its role as the independent arbiter of excessive punishment,
which has shifted the case law away from concerns about the randomness of
punishment as applied to any specific defendant, to a more holistic consideration
of proportionality).
25 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 100th Cong. 86 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Nomina-
tion] (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy).
26 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
27 See infra notes 206–37 and accompanying text (describing the ascendency
of constitutional liberty in the marriage doctrine).
28 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06.
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then, has borrowed from, and developed with, the value of con-
stitutional liberty in other discrete constitutional rights.
In refocusing the debate on constitutional liberty and the
Court’s Eighth Amendment exemplification of that value, this
Article sets the groundwork for reinventing contemporary crim-
inal justice jurisprudence, including life without parole for ju-
venile homicide offenders, life without parole for non-violent
drug offenders, the death penalty, certain mandatory minimum
sentences, and the prolonged use of solitary confinement.29
To this end, this Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I be-
gins by proposing and defending the claim that the purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is to guard against legislative retribu-
tive excess, especially overreaches that result from moral
panic.  Part II charts the Court’s gradual acceptance of this
understanding of the Eighth Amendment, mapping out the
waning influence of the previously dominant jurisprudential
strands of procedural fairness and case-by-case proportional-
ity, and the rise of liberty-driven categorical exemptions and
functional consensus evaluation.  Part III situates the concep-
tion of Eighth Amendment liberty in its broader context, argu-
ing that the evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects
broader normative determinations about the role of constitu-
tional rights and judicial enforcement of those rights in a con-
stitutional democracy.  Finally, building on the Court’s evolving
jurisprudence, in Part IV we sketch a likely trajectory of future
Eighth Amendment claims, demarcating both the promise and
the limitations of the Kennedy framework.
I
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND RETRIBUTIVE EXCESS
To begin with, what is the fundamental purpose of the
Eighth Amendment?  This Part presents the claim that the
Eighth Amendment is a structural constitutional protection
specifically tailored to curb legislative retributive excess, par-
ticularly in times of moral panic.  In this Article, we use the
term “moral panic” to refer to a legislative overreaction to iso-
lated criminal conduct.  In subpart A, we explore this idea of
moral panic and the impact of moral panic on crime and pun-
ishment, specifically how moral panic typically results in exces-
sively harsh punishments.
29 See infra notes 277–341 and accompanying text (outlining the near-term
trajectory of constitutional liberty on these contemporary—and critical—areas of
criminal justice).
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Subpart B suggests that the purpose of the Eighth Amend-
ment is to guard against these retributively excessive laws.  The
subpart argues that the best interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is that it directs the judiciary to intervene to cor-
rect any lack of legislative restraint and modesty evident in
criminal laws and procedures.  The subpart also foreshadows
the discussion in Part II and overviews the Supreme Court’s
performance on that dimension, suggesting that while the
Court has historically been hesitant to employ the Eighth
Amendment such that it acts as a counter-majoritarian weight,
recent doctrinal developments suggest the Court is actively
moving to accept a broader role in mitigating retributive excess.
A. Moral Panic and Retributive Excess
Moral panic can be best defined as “an exaggeration or
distortion of some perceived deviant behavior or criminal activ-
ity.”30  In a situation of moral panic, a salient yet unrepresenta-
tive crime captures the public imagination.31  Or a legitimate
spike in crime occurs and consequently overzealous fear and
anger spread through the public.  The issue is frequently
presented in a “stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media [with] the moral barricades [being] manned by editors,
bishops, politicians or other right-thinking people.”32
Legislators feel these same emotions.  In addition, legisla-
tors perceive the desires of their constituents, both directly and
30 Dawn Rothe & Stephen L. Muzzatti, Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral
Panic, and US Civil Society, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 327, 329 (2004).  On the idea
of moral panic, see, for example, Ronald Burns & Charles Crawford, School Shoot-
ings, the Media, and Public Fear: Ingredients for a Moral Panic, 21 CRIME, L. & SOC.
CHANGE. 147, 157–58 (1999) (discussing the influence of the media on moral panic
surrounding school shootings); Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral
Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefield, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 808–12
(2014) (addressing moral panic over “bad mothers” leading to criminalization of
normal risks of pregnancy like stillbirth); Kaytee Vota, The Truth Behind Echols v.
State: How an Alford Guilty Plea Saved the West Memphis Three, 45 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1003, 1004 (2012) (explaining how Satanic ritual abuse panic in the 1980s
and 1990s contributed to innocent men interested in gothic fashion and heavy
metal music being wrongfully convicted of three murders).
31 See Burns & Crawford, supra note 30, at 150 (“[T]here must be a belief . . .
that a greater portion of the population is engaged in this disturbing behavior
than actually is, or that the harm incurred is greater than what has occurred.”);
Rothe & Muzzatti, supra note 30, at 329 (“[Media coverage] serves to inflate the
seriousness of the incidents, making them appear more heinous and frequent
than they truly are.  Public anxiety is whipped up . . . .”).
32 Rothe & Muzzatti, supra note 30, at 328 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, FOLK
DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS 9 (1972)).
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via the media and relevant interest groups.33  Subsequently,
legislators are motivated to respond to community outrage, and
new laws are drafted and punishment is ratcheted-up.34  And
then, inevitably, the panic fades.  Perhaps the legislature re-
peals some of the worst excesses.35 But thousands and
thousands of people suffer from the now-anachronistic wrath;
and, selectively, a few people36—often racial minorities or par-
ticularly vulnerable people—will continue to face the wrath in
the future as, for example, the personalities of outlier local
33 See Burns & Crawford, supra note 30, at 159 (“Media outlets . . . enable
‘issue-identification’ by which politicians are able to determine which topics they
need to address . . . .”).
34 This legislative behavior is rational according to the public choice litera-
ture, even if extra punishment is unnecessary for public safety.  Public Choice is
“best defined as the application of the rational choice model,” which assumes
actors will always try to maximize the achievement of their individual preferences
for their own self-interest, to “non-market decision-making” like politics.  P.J. Hill,
Public Choice: A Review, 34 FAITH & ECON. 1, 1 (1999). See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1
(1991) (specifying that public choice is “the application of the economist’s meth-
ods to the political scientist’s subject”); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A
Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 202 (1988) (“[T]he public choice literature . . . is an
effort to demonstrate that given certain suppositions about the way political ac-
tors . . . behave, and given certain suppositions about the actual power govern-
ment possess, the democratic sphere is, at its core, an arena of theft, an
unmitigated disaster that should be limited carefully, tolerated only if fundamen-
tally powerless.”); Abner Mikva, Foreward to Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988) (examining a debate surrounding the
public choice model of the politician); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in Perspec-
tive, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Elinor
Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.
137, 139–48 (2000) (examining the theoretical and empirical evidence explaining
the development of public collective action, where individuals cooperate despite
acting in their own self-interest); Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of
Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 553–58 (explaining how social science theory—
including public choice—can be helpful to the study of law).
35 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Weigh Teenage Sexting: Folly or Fel-
ony?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/us/
prosecutors-in-teenage-sexting-cases-ask-foolishness-or-a-felony.html?_r=0 [
https://perma.cc/7DPU-45BX] (explaining that, to avoid ill-fitting child pornog-
raphy charges with mandatory sex offender registration, “[a]bout 20 states  have
adopted new laws intended to address juvenile sexting by providing a less severe
range of legal responses to personal photo-sharing, including misdemeanor
charges that may be expunged, and required community service or counseling.”);
Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Crack Cocaine Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/opinion/greenhouse-crack-cocaine-
limbo.html [https://perma.cc/QYJ9-Q8FZ] (explaining that the commuted
sentences of certain federal prisoners incarcerated for “crack cocaine offenses had
resulted in the harsh penalties mandated by a sentencing formula that Congress
repudiated when it passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010”).
36 See Burns & Crawford, supra note 30, at 149 (“[T]he demonization of these
evildoers . . . is often easy because they are typically already marginalized and
don’t have the resources nor the creditability to counter this stigmatization.”).
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district attorneys continue to use the statute, however
infrequently.37
This description of moral panic is not mere hyperbole.
America endured a series of moral panics in the 1980s and
1990s.38  During this period, while violent crime did rise,39 the
legislative response is best characterized as retributive excess,
where the reaction was out of step with the problem.  Consider
the following examples.
Willie Horton. In 1987, after disappearing while on a fur-
lough from a Massachusetts prison, Willie Horton raped a
woman.40  Republican strategist Lee Atwater used the moment
to attack Michael Dukakis, George H. W. Bush’s main competi-
tion for President.  Atwater’s goal, in his own words: “By the
time we’re finished, they’re going to wonder whether Willie Hor-
ton is Dukakis’ running mate.”41  Television ads ran that used
37 See, e.g., Mike Blasky, Teacher’s Arrest Based on Discriminatory Law, Civil
Rights Advocates Say, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Sept. 24, 2012) http://www.reviewjour
nal.com/news/crime-courts/teachers-arrest-based-discriminatory-law-civil-
rights-advocates-say [https://perma.cc/3PDW-9N3D] (describing case where two
adults, one man and one woman, had three-way sex with a sixteen-year-old girl in
Nevada and only the woman was arrested on a charge of “ ‘solicitation of a minor to
engage in acts constituting crime against nature,’ a holdover from the days when
Nevada banned anal and oral sex”); Bowe Bergdahl Charged With Rarely Used
Misbehavior Before the Enemy, CBS DC (Sept. 8, 2015), http://washington.cbslo
cal.com/2015/09/08/bowe-bergdahl-charge/ [https://perma.cc/EXL7-KJ5T]
(explaining that Bergdahl, captured by the Taliban and imprisoned for years until
a prisoner swap was agreed upon by the U.S., was prosecuted under a law carry-
ing a potential life sentence, despite the law having been “seldom used since
World War II”).
38 See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF
THE MODS AND ROCKERS, ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS xvii–xviii (3d ed., 2002) (detailing the
moral panic of the 1980s surrounding “cult child abuse” where Satanic cults
involved children in “torture, cannibalism and human sacrifice”); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999 NATIONAL
REPORT SERIES JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS 2–3 (2000)
(describing the debunked super-predator theory, which predicted in the 1990s a
large wave of remorseless and violent juvenile offenders).
39 In 1981, the rate of violent crime was 35.3 crimes per 1,000 persons—
higher than at any time before 1977.  Although the violent crime rate briefly
declined between 1982 and 1989, it had risen to 32.1 crimes per 1,000 by 1992.
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1973–92 TRENDS 1 (1994).  Additionally, media coverage of
violent crime increased significantly in the 1990s. See Sara Sun Beale, The News
Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market Driven News Promotes
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 422–36 (2006) (describing the trends
and growth in crime story coverage among network and local media outlets).
40 See Roger Simon, How a Murderer and Rapist Became the Bush Cam-
paign’s Most Valuable Player, BALT. SUN (Nov. 11, 1990), http://articles.baltimore
sun.com/1990-11-11/features/1990315149_1_willie-horton-fournier-michael-
dukakis [https://perma.cc/H3DD-2KPA] (discussing the trajectory of the Willie
Horton phenomenon in politics).
41 Id.
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Horton to depict Dukakis as soft on crime: “Dukakis not only
opposes the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers
to have weekend passes from prison.”42  Then-Senator Joe
Biden said that one of his political goals was “to lock Willie
Horton up in jail.”43  And George Bush, capitalizing on his
tough on crime credibility, told Americans, “We need more pris-
ons, more jails, more courts, more prosecutors.”44  Ultimately,
prison furlough programs—the same ones that Ronald Reagan
touted—disappeared.45  So, too, did parole.  As Senator Rich-
ard Durbin recently told the Marshall Project, “[t]he ghost of
Willie Horton has loomed over any conversation about sentenc-
ing reform for over 30 years.”46
Polly Klaas. In October 1993, in Petaluma, California, a
twelve-year-old girl, Polly Klaas, was abducted and mur-
dered.47  The person who committed the murder was Richard
Davis, a recidivist paroled from a California prison.  The shock-
ing murder instantly captured the imagination of the public,
lending momentum to a proposed statewide ballot initiative—
Proposition 184—that mandated strict mandatory minimum
sentences for recidivist offenders.  Proposition 184, which came
about “[w]ithin days” of Polly’s death, became the “fastest quali-
fying initiative in California history.”48  A few months later,
President Bill Clinton spotlighted the Polly Klass case during
his State of the Union address commenting, “those who commit
repeated violent crimes should be told when you commit a third
violent crime, you will be put away and put away for good.”49
42 A 30-Second Ad on Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1988), http://
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/03/us/a-30-second-ad-on-crime.html [https://
perma.cc/6JRJ-YFWR] (discussing a Dukakis “tough on crime” television
advertisement).
43 EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 146 (1996).
44 Bernard Weinraub, President Offers Strategy for U.S. on Drug Control, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/06/us/president-of-
fers-strategy-for-us-on-drug-control.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/
E2E6-KXA2].
45 Beth Schwartzapfel and Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (May 13, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie
-horton-revisited#.MvFXwWQqy [https://perma.cc/WQ3F-ZUWA].
46 Id.
47 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14–15 (2003).
48 Id. at 15.
49 William J. Clinton, President of the United States, State of the Union Ad-
dress (Jan. 25, 1994), reprinted in WASH. POST http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou94.htm [https://perma.cc/ZFN7-
7URN]. On the President’s State of the Union remarks, see, for example, Gwen
Ifill, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Vows Fight for his Health Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/26/us/state-of-the-
union-the-overview-clinton-vows-fight-for-his-health-plan.html?pagewanted=all
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And then, to roaring applause, Clinton boomed, “three strikes
and you are out.”50  Like a virus, three strikes laws specifi-
cally—and mandatory minimum sentences in particular—be-
gan to spread across the nation.51  Indeed, twenty-four states
enacted three strikes over a two-year period following the death
of Polly Klaas.
Super-predators.  In 1995, Professor John DiIulio and
others warned the nation of a coming “breed” of juvenile offend-
ers who “kill, rape, maim, without giving it a second thought.”52
These are not kids, but “fatherless, Godless, and jobless”
super-predators.53  Campaigning for the omnibus crime con-
trol bill, Hillary Clinton said in 1996: “They are not just gangs
of kids anymore.  They are often the kinds of kids that are
called super-predators.  No conscience, no empathy.  We can
talk about why they ended up that way, but first we have to
bring them to heel.”54  President Bill Clinton further amped-up
the drama proclaiming, “[w]e cannot renew this country when
13-year-old boys get semi-automatic weapons to shoot 9 year
olds for kicks.”55  This super-predator rhetoric significantly
contributed to sharp increases in life without parole sentences
for juveniles, as well as the transfer of cases from juvenile to
adult court.56
The Crack-Cocaine Epidemic. In the 1980s, crack-cocaine
use spiked in American cities, leading doctors and other public
[https://perma.cc/KE59-HD2N] (noting that Clinton was emotional when dis-
cussing his plans to combat crime in America).
50 Clinton, supra note 49; The Book Archive, State of the Union Address:
Speech by President Clinton (1994), YOUTUBE (May 5, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyb0TC_JGFQ [https://perma.cc/3LJV-9MPR].
51 See generally JOHN CLARK ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., “THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION (1997) (comparing the provisions of
three-strikes laws in twenty-four states).
52 Editorial, Echoes of the Superpredator, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/echoes-of-the-superpredator.html
[https://perma.cc/X9V6-THGL].
53 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Arresting Ideas, 74 HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. 12, 15
(1995).
54 Robert Mackey, Hillary Clinton on ‘Superpredators’ in 1996, C-SPAN (Feb.
25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582473/hillary-clinton-super-
predators-1996 [https://perma.cc/R2Q4-YE5P].  Note that this is the same bill
that contained the “three strikes” law referenced by President Bill Clinton in his
1994 state of the union address. See Clinton, supra note 49.
55 Clinton, supra note 49.
56 See JOHN R. MILLS, ANNA M. DORN & AMELIA C. HRITZ, PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT,
NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 9–11 (2015);
see also Michael Bochenek, Trying Children in Adult Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Nov. 1999), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-02.htm
[https://perma.cc/G2QN-E59J] (describing the mistreatment of juvenile defend-
ants in Maryland’s jails).
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health officials to warn of “crack babies”57—the children born
of addicted parents; children forecasted to be of unsound mind
and body—and crack murders spilling out of poor, black, in-
ner-city streets and into white, wealthier suburban neighbor-
hoods.58  This increasingly salient fear of crack, and the
violence it propelled, reached its boiling point in 1986 when
Len Bias, a star college basketball player that the Boston Cel-
tics had drafted, died after using cocaine.59  Congress immedi-
ately held hearings on the crack-cocaine epidemic wherein
legislators invoked Bias’s name eleven times.60  A few months
later, President Reagan signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, which contained a 100:1 sentencing disparity for posses-
sion of crack relative to powder cocaine.61
Taken together, these panic-fueled legislative enactments
contributed to a meteoric and unprecedented increase in our
national jail and prison populations.62  At its peak, the Ameri-
57 See Charles Krauthammer, Worse Than ‘Brave New World’: Newborns Per-
manently Damaged by Cocaine, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 1, 1989), http://articles.
philly.com/1989-08-01/news/26148256_1_cocaine-babies-crack-babies-dam
age [https://perma.cc/9TR6-K7QQ]; see also Stacey Burling, The Littlest Victims
of Cocaine, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 24, 1989), http://articles.philly.com/1989-08-
24/news/26150896_1_babies-foster-care-supervisor-cocaine [https://perma.cc/
AW36-B4PB] (discussing the “growing number of babies in Chester County are
being born with cocaine in their systems”). But see Janine Jackson, The Myth of
the ‘Crack Baby,’ FAIR (Sept. 1, 1998), http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/the-
myth-of-the-crack-baby/ [https://perma.cc/AVR9-QFP5] (explaining the media
myth of the “crack baby” as inferior and doomed, while listing a number of articles
that perpetuated this myth).
58 See Peter Kerr, A Crack Plague in Queens Brings Violence and Fear, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/19/nyregion/a-crack-
plague-in-queens-brings-violence-and-fear.html?pagewanted=all [https://
perma.cc/4F4H-8CP9]; see also Nicholas M. Horrock, Crack Wars Push Murder
Rates to Record Level in Washington, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 6, 1988), http://arti-
cles.chicagotribune.com/1988-11-06/news/8802130346_1_murder-rate-crack-
nightclub [https://perma.cc/KG3T-RT3M] (describing rise in violence relating to
crack epidemic).
59 See Jonathan Easley, The Day the Drug War Really Started, SALON (Jun.
19, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/19/len_bias_cocaine_tragedy_still_
affecting_us_drug_law/ [https://perma.cc/BSJ6-6KDV].
60 United States v. Petersen, 143 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573 (E.D. Va. 2001).
61 Easley, supra note 59.
62 Some reasons for this explosion in the incarcerated population include,
among other things, the federalization of crime; extreme political pressure to not
seem “soft on crime”; lack of political power from the incarcerated and the ex-
offender populations due to poverty and disenfranchisement; and a general lack
of desire to fund public services. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but
Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307,
310–11 (2008).  John Gleissner focuses on the war on drugs perpetuated by the
conservative political wing, stating that the “primary mistake made by law & order
interests, including most conservatives, is that we tried to pile on more prison
time, mandatory sentences and three-strikes legislation in a failed effort to attack
the supply of illegal drugs.”  John Dewar Gleissner, A Conservative View of Incar-
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can justice system incarcerated one in one-hundred citizens—
a tenfold increase over forty years.63  This is the aftermath of
moral panic, the outsized fear over violence in response to a
very real increase in violent crime.  As one scholar explains,
“People’s opinions about the sentences required for proper
criminal punishment fluctuate as a function of their current
perceptions of the threat of crimes and, more generally, their
state of fear.”64  In turn, legislators sense this fear in their
constituents, often lending support to stricter laws and har-
sher punishments based on a “public preference formed from
miscalculations of risk.”65
Public anger matters, too.  One scholar found that even
after “controlling for other factors such as racial prejudice, fear
of crime, causal attributions for criminal behavior, and political
ideology,” “anger about crime is a significant predictor of puni-
tive attitudes.”66  Whether anger or fear is the primary driver,
political scientists have found that the data indicate that
“shifts in the public’s punitiveness appear to have preceded
shifts in congressional attention to criminal justice issues.”67
Moreover, “the public’s increasing punitiveness has been a pri-
mary determinant of the incarceration rate.”68  Consequently,
for over a quarter-century, the American justice system ap-
peared to be a “one-way ratchet”—more punishment, harsher
punishment, less opportunity for redemption.69
Yet, fear and anger necessarily diminishes over time.  In
2012, for example, voters in California repealed a significant
ceration Reform, CORRECTIONS.COM (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.corrections.com/
news/article/34129-a-conservative-view-of-incarceration-reform [https://
perma.cc/LVK3-B8NF].
63 The Justice Policy Institute documented the 1970 prison population as
338,029 people. See JUS. POL’Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTI-
MATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1, 1 (2000) (using data from U.S. Department of Justice).
By analyzing “the whole pie” of incarceration, the Prison Policy Institute estimates
that the United States incarcerated approximately 2.3 million people on any given
day in 2015.  Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole
Pie 2015, PRISON PO’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/re
ports/pie2015.html [https://perma.cc/GN8W-ULLC].
64 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940,
1989 (2010).
65 Id. at 1990 n.172 (citing Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications
of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 771–79
(1990)).
66 Devon Johnson, Anger About Crime and Support for Punitive Criminal Jus-
tice Policies, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 51, 51 (2009).
67 Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on
Mass Incarceration in the United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 858 (2014).
68 Id.
69 Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 310.
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part of the three-strikes law—ending life imprisonment for
most non-violent offenses—with 69% of the vote.70  Discussing
the federal crime bill, Bill Clinton said recently that his admin-
istration had “overshot the mark.”71  Hillary Clinton too has
noted that “[d]ecisions were made in the ‘80s and ‘90s to deal
with what was at that time a very high crime rate . . . a lot was
done that went further than it needed to go and so now we are
facing problems with mass incarceration.”72  Even Lee Atwater,
the strategist who used prison furloughs to call Dukakis “soft
on crime,” backtracked.73  He said that he, like society, was
missing “a little heart, a lot of brotherhood”74 and that state-
ments he made reeked of “naked cruelty.”75
Further, time permits robust research to be conducted
measuring the voracity of claims made in times of a moral
panic.  For example, it turns out that crack babies are a myth,
with recent studies illustrating that there is no significant dif-
ference in the “long-term health and life outcomes between full-
term babies exposed to cocaine in-utero and those who were
not.”76  Super-predators are a myth, too.77  As John DiIulio, the
political scientist who coined the term recently conceded, “de-
70 Aaron Sankin, California Prop 36, Measure Reforming State’s Three Strikes
Law, Approved by Wide Majority of Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/california-prop-36_n_2089179.html
[https://perma.cc/75KJ-TCSA].
71 Mollie Reilly, Bill Clinton: ‘We Have Overshot the Mark’ on Incarceration,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/28/
bill-clinton-mass-incarceration_n_7164712.html [https://perma.cc/U3NJ-EL
J3].
72 Samantha Lachman, Hillary Clinton Continues to Distance Herself from Her




73 expolitico, A Little Heart, A Lot of Brotherhood vs. the Politics of Fear, DAILY
KOS (Jul. 11, 2006), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/7/11/226417/-
[https://perma.cc/8JEL-KY8M].
74 Id.




76 Katie McDonough, Long-Term Study Debunks Myth of the “Crack Baby”,
SALON (Jul. 23, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/23/longterm_study_de
bunks_myth_of_the_crack_baby/ [https://perma.cc/BXA8-CT98]; see also Jen-
nifer M. Handzel et al., Longitudinal Follow-up of Poor Inner-City Youth Between
Ages 8 and 18: Intentions Versus Reality, 129 PEDIATRICS 473, 476–78 (2012)
(finding that a greater exposure to “violence and poorer home environment” were
most likely to affect youth outcome rather than gestational cocaine exposure).
77 N.Y. TIMES, supra note 52.
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mography is not fate and criminology is not pure science.”78
Professor DiIulio joined dozens of other scholars in filing an
amicus brief that urged the U.S. Supreme Court to bar life
without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.79  That brief
noted that, “the fear of an impending generation of super-
predators proved to be unfounded.  Empirical research that
has analyzed the increase in violent crime during the early-to
mid-1990s and its subsequent decline demonstrates that the
juvenile superpredator was a myth and the predictions of fu-
ture youth violence were baseless.”80
Even those most susceptible to moral panic, legislators,
have indicated a softening of the rhetoric surrounding criminal
justice and the heightened punishment regimes of the past few
decades.  Today, there is serious bipartisan support for crimi-
nal justice reform at the state and federal levels.  For example,
Senators Corey Booker and Rand Paul are working together to
reform criminal justice.81  Right on Crime, a conservative led
organization, has successfully lobbied for sentencing reform
across the United States, including in traditionally punitive
states such as Mississippi.82  Even Koch Industries—the Re-
publican super-funders—are investing funds into fighting
some of the penal extravagance of the last quarter-century.83
However, even under the most optimistic of outlooks, legis-
lative softening of punishment will not reverse all—or even
most—of the retributive excess of the past decades.  The
changes that are occurring are around the edges: for example,
the crack-powder disparity is now 18:1;84 in Oklahoma, small
scale drug trafficking isn’t subject to an automatic life sen-
78 Steve Drizin, The ‘Superpredator’ Scare Revisited, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-drizin/the-superpredator-scare_b_
5113793.html [https://perma.cc/9V3D-XCR4].
79 Brief for Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae, Miller v. Alabama, 132 U.S.
2455 (2012).
80 Id. at 8.
81 Jonathan D. Salant, Cory Booker, Rand Paul Push to Overhaul Criminal
Justice System, NJ.COM (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/
2015/03/booker_and_paul_re-introduce_legislation_to_overha.html [https://
perma.cc/82CR-JDDC].
82 Mississippi Flips Stance on Reforms, for the Better, RIGHT ON CRIME (June
14, 2011), http://rightoncrime.com/2011/06/mississippi-flips-stance-on-re
forms-for-the-better/ [https://perma.cc/32KU-HBMT].
83 Dana Liebelson, Inside the Koch Campaign to Reform Criminal Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/09/
koch-brothers_n_6646540.html [https://perma.cc/3RJN-8V93].
84 FAIR SENTENCING ACT, American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.
aclu.org/node/17576 [https://perma.cc/HWZ4-9MMP]; see also Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2012) (codified in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, 844) (changing the sentencing scheme for possession crack cocaine).
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tence;85 and in California, a new offense of stealing a few golf
clubs won’t result in life imprisonment for a person with two
other felony convictions.86  Yet, for thousands of prisoners, new
laws will not spell relief as legislative changes to punishment
often are not retroactive.87  In Oklahoma, for example, over fifty
people who received automatic life sentences are set to die in
prison for crimes that would no longer trigger that rule.88
Further, even these mostly peripheral and non-retroactive
reforms are not happening everywhere.  For instance, in 2015,
the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed an automatic life sen-
tence upon a seventy-six-year-old man for a non-violent drug
offense.89  The trial judge said he wished to impose a sentence
of “less than life without parole”; but, he concluded that the
statute leaves no room for “discretion by the Court.”90  In an
opinion affirming the sentence, the chief justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court concurred, but called the sentence “excessive
and unjustified”91 and urged the “legislature to revisit that
statutory sentencing scheme to determine whether it serves an
appropriate purpose.”92
Critically, we are not immune to new incidents of moral
panic, and political moments that ratchet down retributive ex-
cess do not last forever.  The thing about moral panic is that it
can sweep the nation in ways that often defy reason and pre-
diction.  A particularly salient and shocking crime, especially
85 Hannah Rappleye, ‘They Sentenced Me to Die in Prison’, NBCNEWS (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/they-sentenced-me-die-prison
-n459511 [https://perma.cc/T8AF-LLJK] (discussing passage of Oklahoma’s
2015 Justice Safety Valve Act, which changed the mandatory minimum for a third
drug felony from life without parole to twenty years); see also Justice Safety Valve
Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws 243 (giving judges authority to depart from mandatory
minimum sentences for “substantial and compelling reasons”).
86 See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, THE AMENDMENT OF THE THREE
STRIKES SENTENCING LAW 5 (2016) (explaining that a third non-violent felony will not
automatically trigger a 25-to-life sentence under the new sentencing scheme);
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Cal. Ballot Proposition 36 (2012).
87 The United States Sentencing Commission did vote in 2011 to make parts
of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. Frequently Asked Questions: 2011 Retroac-




88 Rappleye, supra note 85.
89 Associated Press, Roy Moore: Life Sentence for Drug Violation Shows ‘Grave
Flaw’ in Sentencing, AL.COM (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf
/2015/09/roy_moore_life_sentence_for_dr.html [https://perma.cc/SB9L-P732].
90 Ex parte Lee Carroll Brooker, No. 1141160, at *1 (Ala. Sept. 11, 2015)
(Moore, C.J., concurring).
91 Id.
92 Id. at *6.
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one committed by a person with a prior record, however unrep-
resentative of crime generally, could lead to a new statute or
sentencing enhancement.  Consider the so-called “Ferguson
Effect,” the idea that violent crime “spike[d]” in 2015 because of
a national disrespect for the police as illustrated by people
protesting police shootings of unarmed civilians.93  It turns out
that the “effect” was imaginary, but that did not stop the New
York Times, Wall Street Journal and other publications—not to
mention police chiefs, union officials, and the FBI—from
breathlessly repeating the idea.94
Fortunately, unlike in prior decades, the rise of social me-
dia and participatory journalism permitted swift and definitive
discrediting of the idea before it ballooned.95  But the drafters
of the Eighth Amendment seem not to have believed that
would-be criminal defendants should be at the mercy of the
Twitter-verse when it comes to avoiding the retributive excess
of moral panics.  As we discuss in subpart B, the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
creates an institutional obligation for the judiciary to ensure
“moderation and restraint” in the imposition of punishment.96
93 Evan Perez et al., FBI Chief Tries to Deal with the ‘Ferguson Effect’, CNN
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/politics/fbi-comey-crime-po
lice/ [https://perma.cc/T28G-C7QQ].
94 See, e.g., Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Murder Rates Rising Sharply in
Many U.S. Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1KACvGj (reporting
that for “some experts and rank-and-file officers, the notion that less aggressive
policing has emboldened criminals — known as the ‘Ferguson effect’” explains the
rise in violence in many cities); Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The New Nation-
wide Crime Wave, WALL STREET J. (May 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425 [https://perma.cc/HAD2-9FZN]
(lamenting that an “incessant drumbeat against the police has resulted in . . . the
‘Ferguson effect’”); Angie Ricono, FBI Says Public Scrutiny Impacts Policing, KCTV-
5 NEWS (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.kctv5.com/story/30506367/fbi-says-pub-
lic-scrutiny-impacts-policing [https://perma.cc/UNF6-6MFD] (reporting on FBI
director’s belief that “officers might start to be afraid to step out of their patrol
cars” when faced with public scrutiny).
95 See, e.g., Cristian Farias, The ‘Ferguson Effect’ Isn’t Real, and the New York
Times Shouldn’t Act Like It Might Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2015), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-times-ferguson-effect_us_55e833
b7e4b0c818f61ab744 [https://perma.cc/LC8K-EQGE] (criticizing the media for
reporting on the “Ferguson effect” based on “bad math and bad science”);
Carimah Townes, The Myth of the ‘Ferguson Effect’, THINKPROGRESS (Jun. 17,
2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/06/17/3670203/ferguson-effect-
isnt-real-in-st-louis/ [https://perma.cc/D7YU-ET89] (reporting that “evidence
does not support a causal relationship between the events that unfolded in Fergu-
son and subsequent homicides” in St. Louis).
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That is, the Eighth Amendment provides a backstop against
new and continuing retributive excesses that result from moral
panic.
B. The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Protecting
Against Moral Panic
The Supreme Court has long recognized the unique role of
the Eighth Amendment in protecting against retributive excess.
In the 1910 decision of Weems v. United States, the Court
struck down the sentence of “confinement in a penal institu-
tion for twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist
of the offender, [at] hard and painful labor,” as well as “a per-
petual limitation of his liberty”97 (including the right to hold
office, vote, receive retirement pay, and change his domicile
without prior government approval) for a disbursing officer
with the U.S. Coast Guard found guilty of falsifying an official
document.98
In striking down the sentence as violative of the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, Justice
McKenna held that that sentence reflected an “unrestrained”
exercise of government power, and not merely “different exer-
cises of legislative judgment.”99  In losing the ability to punish
Weems so severely, the government, McKenna wrote, “suffers
nothing and loses no power,” because the “the purpose of pun-
ishment is fulfilled” with a lesser punishment that is of “just,
not tormenting severity” and that leaves “hope” for “the refor-
mation of the criminal.”100
As the Weems Court explained, the Eighth Amendment is
protection against disproportionate punishment.101  As we dis-
cuss in depth in Parts II and III, the idea of disproportionality
captured in the Eighth Amendment is undergirded by a deeper
principle of constitutional liberty, which includes the right to
be free from undue government coercion.  When a punishment
is disproportionate—and an individual’s liberty is unnecessa-
97 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
98 Id. at 362–64.
99 Id. at 381–82.
100 Id. at 381.
101 Id. at 353; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837–38 (1988)
(holding that death penalty is disproportionate punishment for juvenile offender
under sixteen because of the malleability of a person of that age); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that death penalty is not a proportionate
punishment as applied to any juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (applying the same logic to the intellectually disabled); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprison-
ment for the passing of a bad check by a convicted felon).
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rily restrained—the government fails to live up to its most basic
duty: to affirm the basic human dignity of every person, even
those who commit serious transgressions.102  This claim re-
quires significant unpacking, and in Part II we undertake an
in-depth case study of the Court’s Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence that supports this understanding of the Constitu-
tion’s role vis-à-vis criminal defendants before examining the
idea of liberty as a constitutional value more generally in Part
III.
Suffice it to say, however, that this conception of the
Eighth Amendment as enshrining the value of constitutional
liberty—to be operationalized by the judiciary as a bulwark
against retributive excess—is a vision of the Amendment that
steps beyond traditional conceptions of the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment.  Traditionally, the Eighth
Amendment protections are discussed as providing a backstop
against a punishment practice that was once supported by
right-headed legislative judgments, but that lost its reasona-
bleness as society evolved.103  However, this conception of the
Amendment fails to account not only for the broader concep-
tion of individual rights that the Constitution enshrines, but
the on-the-ground reality of crime and punishment in America.
As we noted in subpart A, the lesson of the past few decades is
that retributive excess often results not from reasonable legis-
lative judgments that fail to stand the test of time, but rather
from unrestrained and immoderate legislative excess that is
induced by the fear, anger, and poor risk-management that
moral panics like the juvenile super-predator and crack
epidemics entail.  In light of this, the traditional, narrow con-
ception of the Amendment renders the provision a veritable
nullity.  This is untenable.  The Eighth Amendment arguably
has a significantly broader role; its prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments, then, is in large part a protection
against this grim picture of moral panic.
This conception of the Eighth Amendment necessarily en-
genders a question that we have asked previously: What role
has the Court taken to promote the Eighth Amendment as a
bulwark against retributive excess in the democratic
branches?104  Unfortunately, the answer is that the Court has
102 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58–59 (2010).
103 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957) (holding that Eighth Amend-
ment is entwined with evolving standards of decency, which required that dena-
tionalization not be used as punishment).
104 See Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV 605,
650 (2016) (arguing that the Court’s disaggregated assessment of constitutional
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historically failed to live up to its constitutional responsibilities
in protecting these “discrete and insular minorities.”105  While
the Court has occasionally noted that its role as protecting
individuals against majoritarianism is particularly important
in the Eighth Amendment context,106 at core, the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence presents “a worrying narra-
tive of majoritarianism, whereby the decision to” uphold or
strike down laws relating to punishment has historically re-
flected the will of “dominant classes and harms subordinate
and vulnerable groups.”107  That is, until recently, the Court’s
criminal justice jurisprudence closely aligns with contempo-
rary public opinion and the views of the political branches.108
While a robust body of scholarship has described the Court’s
majoritarian tendencies,109 these concerns are arguably ampli-
rights-holders undermines the Court’s persona as the institutional protector of
individual rights).
105 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53, n.4 (1938).
106 For example, Kennedy wrote in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
435–36 (2008), that courts are supposed to step in to ensure “restraint and
moderation” in punishment.  Justice William Brennan put the point, especially in
times of public panic over real or perceived crime spikes: “Those whom we would
banish from society or from the human community itself often speak in too faint a
voice to be heard above society’s demand for punishment.  It is the particular role
of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian
chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life.”  McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107 Robinson, supra note 104, at 646 (making this claim in a more generalized R
context).
108 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192
(1989) (“Overall, the evidence suggests that the modern Court has been an essen-
tially majoritarian institution.”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424 (2002) (“Supreme Court
decisions by and large correspond with public opinion.” (citations omitted)); Dar-
ren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy,
and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2–3 (2005) (claiming that the
Supreme Court is a majoritarian, rather than a countermajoritarian, institution);
Willliam Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajori-
tarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (“Our analyses indicate that for most of the period
since 1956, the Court has been highly responsive to majority opinion.”); Helmut
Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Response, Popular Influences on Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 711 (1994) (“[N]umerous scholars have found
that the Court is not generally out of line with public opinion.”).
109 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 108, at 20 n.119 (stating that the “ ‘re-
sults’ in legal contests ‘come from those same political social, moral, and religious
value judgments from which the law purports to be independent’” (quoting David
Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 247–49 (1984))); Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 5 (1984) (“Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is
not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controver-
sial political choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institu-
tions appear natural and our rules appear neutral.”).
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fied in the context of crime and punishment due to the particu-
larly vulnerable nature of the rights-holder.
Conventional literature portrays the Supreme Court as the
institutional enforcer of rights, with the Court typically viewed
as the bulwark against governmental transgressions on indi-
vidual rights.110  Most famously associated with John Hart
Ely’s defense of judicial review, this general conception of the
Court sees the institution as the protector of the rights of indi-
viduals against abridgement by transient popular majori-
ties.111  This conception of the Court, it is argued, finds its
roots in the original intent of the Framers, who recognized the
importance of guarding against “one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part. . . . If a majority be united by a
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”112
The Court has overtly accepted this characterization of its role,
commenting in Barnette that
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One’s right to . . . liberty . . . may not be submitted to vote; [it]
depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.113
110 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 104, at 648–49 (summarizing the scholarly R
literature on judicial majoritarianism); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (justifying judicial review on the
grounds that it ensures the protection of vulnerable minorities from majoritarian
abuse); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1996) (arguing that the perception of Supreme Court
as protector of “minority rights from majoritarian overreaching” is one that “exer-
cises a powerful hold over our constitutional discourse”). But see Mark A. Graber,
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Or-
der, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 380 (2008) (discussing how judicial review
“changes political dynamics”); Andrei Marmor, Randomized Judicial Review, USC
GOULD LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 15–8, at 2 (2015) (suggesting that the
countermajoritarian rationale for Constitutional Judicial Review is flawed); Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 158 (2010) (arguing that the power of other government institutions
constrains the Court’s ability to be wholly countermajoritarian).
111 See ELY, supra note 110, at 135–36.  This understanding of the judicial role
is best exemplified by the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minor-
ities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . . may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see also supra notes 9–10, and
accompanying text (discussing the Framers’ view of the Court as a counter
majoritarian check).
113 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942).
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However, while the Court as a countermajoritarian institution
provides a popular justification for judicial review, increasingly
scholars are challenging the depiction of the Court as “the de-
fender of unpopular minorities.”114  This counternarrative ar-
gues that the Court in fact functions as a majoritarian
institution, with, “the policy views dominant on the Court . . .
never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”115  Scholars
have demonstrated the voracity of this claim, exploring
swathes of constitutional doctrine that evidence that “far from
being a countermajoritarian institution, the Supreme Court
primarily functions to enforce and enshrine majoritarian
views,”116 with its decisions reflecting the preferences and
views of America’s popular majority.117  As one scholar sug-
gests, the Court “does not speak for everyone, but for a political
faction trying to constitute itself as a unit of many disparate
voices; its power lasts only as long as the contradictory voices
remain silenced.”118  Professor Corinna Lain has noted that,
114 Robinson, supra note 104, at 649. R
115 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).  For Dahl, the Court is “inevi-
tably a part of the dominant national alliance,” because “it would appear, on
political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members
are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms
of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.” Id. at
291–93.  See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008) (discussing how political actors constrain
the Supreme Court’s decision making); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUDGES MAKE 137–57 (1998) (arguing the Court’s relationship with the other
branches of government prevent the Justices from deciding based on personal
policy preferences); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 108, at 3–26 (explaining Congress’
influence over judicial decisions).
116 Robinson, supra note 104, at 649–50 (quoting Pildes, supra note 110, at R
110); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
177–94 (2000) (arguing that popular opinion has a profound impact on constitu-
tional law); Hutchinson, supra note 108, at 19–22 (discussing the contributions of
critical race theorists to the literature rebutting the “countermajoritarian diffi-
culty”). But cf. Richard H. Fallon Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1210 (1987) (arguing that the
Constitution has both majoritatian and countermajoritarian elements); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 629 (1993) (argu-
ing that the Constitution is neither majoritarian nor countermajoritarian because
“government operates not to represent a majority but to hear and integrate the
voices of many different constituencies”).
117 See Pildes, supra note 110, at 126; cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS R
SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977) (arguing that individual rights precede the interest of
the majority). See generally Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitu-
tional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 674–92 (2005) (surveying
majoritarian constitutional theories).
118 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 582–83 (1990).
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“the force of majority will imposes constraints on the Justices’
ability to deviate significantly, and for long, from the public’s
views.”119
This counternarrative is deeply troubling for proponents of
robust rights for criminal defendants and challenges the per-
ception of the Court as a bulwark against majoritarian exces-
sive in punishment.120
That the judiciary would intervene to eradicate excessive
punishment reads like an empty promise.  The Court itself, in
an opinion that Justice Kennedy authored, recently character-
ized some of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “not alto-
gether satisfactory” and “still in search of a unifying
principle.”121  Justice David Souter, dissenting from an opinion
that upheld a life sentence for shoplifting, said that if the sen-
tence in that case “is not grossly disproportionate, the principle
has no meaning.”122  Other commentators are even more bru-
tal.  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky said in 2003 that the Court
had declared that “there will be no relief from inhumane
sentences in the courts.”123  Professor Anthony Amsterdam
called the Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, where it af-
firmed the constitutionality of the death penalty despite power-
ful evidence of racial disparities in its administration, “the Dred
Scott decision of our time.”124  And Professor Tom Stacy, sum-
ming up what is possibly the majority view among scholars and
court-watchers, said that the whole jurisprudence is “plagued
by deep inconsistencies” and is a “mess.”125
However, echoing a theme of this Article, the majority view
is not always the most accurate.  We concede that it is true that
119 Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 113,
160 (2012).
120 See ELY, supra note 110, at 174–76; Joseph Raz, Rights and Individual
Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS
44–60 (1995); see also Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting) (noting that “of the cases in this Court in which the Four-
teenth Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less
than one-half of one per cent. invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more
than fifty [percent] asked that its benefits be extended to corporations”).
121 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436–37 (2008).
122 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
123 Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, 3 Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and Unfair, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/10/opinion/oe-
chem10 [https://perma.cc/XG4L-64L9].
124 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty
Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 47 (2007).
125 Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 475, 475 (2005) (“The Court’s jurisprudence is plagued by deep inconsis-
tencies concerning the Amendment’s text, the Court’s own role, and a constitu-
tional requirement of proportionate punishment.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 26 17-JAN-17 12:39
438 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:413
for most of its history, the Court has failed to live up to its
obligations to protect unpopular and vulnerable citizens from
legislative excess.  We also concede that in failing to perform
that role, the Court has been complicit in the suffering that the
anger and fear of moral panics entail.  However, we argue that
the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has be-
gun to shift the mechanics and scope of the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in ways that portend that an Eighth Amendment
revolution is on the horizon.  This shift, and its broader impli-
cations, is the subject of Part II.
II
THE ORIGINS AND ASCENDENCY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
LIBERTY
The goal of this Part is to chart the trajectory of the Court’s
approach to questions of retributive excess challenged under
the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sion.  This Part undertakes this goal by disaggregating and
examining three discrete yet interrelated bodies of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.  Together, they show the modern
Court’s move away from a narrow and limited conception of
cruel and unusual punishment to a more robust conception of
the Eighth Amendment as a right whose goal is to empower the
Court to curb retributive excess.
To this end, subpart A examines the Court’s shift toward
categorical exemptions, examining punishment practices as a
whole, to strike down excessive punishment practices.  This
shift has come at the expense of the narrow and limited Eighth
Amendment jurisprudential fault lines that focus on case-by-
case proportionality analysis as well as procedural regulation
of statutory punishments.
Subpart B takes up where subpart A leaves off, examining
the Court’s burgeoning categorical exemption jurisprudence.
Building on the analysis in subpart A, subpart B demonstrates
that the Court has begun to embrace its role as the indepen-
dent arbiter of excessive punishment, shifting the case law
away from concerns about the randomness of punishment as
applied to any specific defendant to a more holistic considera-
tion of proportionality; that is, the fit between the culpability of
the defendant and the purpose of the punishment.  In so doing,
the Court has begun to overtly refer to principles of liberty and
dignity as driving these constitutionally directed proportional-
ity determinations.
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Finally, subpart C takes up the functional question of mea-
surement: if the Court is engaged in categorical exemptions
where retribution will always be considered constitutionally ex-
cessive, how does the Court determine what is or is not exces-
sive?  That is, what are the indicators the Court relies on to
determine constitutionally excessive punishments in the con-
text of a modern democratic society? Subpart C discusses the
Court’s move to a functional assessment of societal standards
of decency, which again emphasizes the value of individual
liberty as its constitutional guidepost.
Together, these discrete aspects of the Court’s emerging
Eighth Amendment project evidence a doctrine that is less fast-
ened to procedural regulation or case-by-case proportionality
review, more focused on categorical decisions anchored in the
penological purpose that the punishment serves as applied to a
particular category of crimes or class of offenders, and driven
by functionally accurate methods of assessing contemporary
societal standards.  This is a doctrine that is more respectful of
horizontal and vertical federalism and more aware of the insti-
tutional limitations of the judiciary, yet simultaneously, more
self-confident in the role of the Court in guarding against a lack
of legislative moderation and restraint.  With these changes,
the Court has begun to alter the course of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment jurisprudence in ways that make a more ro-
bust Eighth Amendment plausible.
A. Imposition of Substantive Limits on Offender and
Crime Classes
With Justice Kennedy at the helm, the Court has shifted
away from interpreting the Eighth Amendment as an instru-
ment requiring “super due process” in order to ensure the fair-
ness and rationality of sentencing outcomes as well as case-by-
case review of excessive sentences.  This subpart discusses
those doctrinal shifts.
1. The Shift Away from the “Super Due Process”
Procedural Regulations
This section tracks the Court’s fading interest in using pro-
cedural regulations to monitor the processes that can result in
constitutionally cruel and unusual punishments.  This shift is
important for two reasons.  First, as we describe below, the
procedural regulation route did not guarantee or even provide
judicial monitoring of the substantive limitations that the
Eighth Amendment imposes upon punishment.  Second, regu-
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lating procedure required the Court to depart from its institu-
tional competence and to delve into the micro-workings of state
legislatures and courts.
The rise of the procedural regulation approach started with
(and remained limited to) the death penalty.126  In 1972, the
Court held that then-existing death penalty statutes violated
the constitution because the utter lack of standards for how to
decide who lives and dies resulted in a system, which, in the
words of Justice Potter Stewart, produced “death sentences
[that] are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.”127  States created new stat-
utes that narrowed the pool of eligible offenders, channeled
juror discretion, and provided meaningful appellate review,
among other procedural innovations.128  The Court affirmed
the validity of these new statutes, making explicit its faith that
these procedural protections could ensure rationality and pro-
duce consistent results.129
Instead of monitoring the results that emerged under the
redesigned death sentencing statutes, the Court
micromanaged the capital punishment process.  For example,
it regulated the substance and review of aggravating factors.130
126 See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super
Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1980); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Consti-
tutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 421–26 (1995).
See generally RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2006) (outlining the Supreme Court’s death penalty deci-
sions); NINA RIVKINO & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY
(2d ed. 2005) (same).
127 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).  In
those days, at least in theory, a person who committed a rape or a kidnapping
could receive the death penalty. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Moreover,
the death penalty trial had but one phase.  The jury did not receive a list of
aggravating factors or mitigating factors.  The state simply asked the jury whether
it recommended death or a lesser sanction. JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 220 (2000) (describing the capital
trial process in the pre-Furman era).
128 See generally Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases
by State High Courts After Gregg: Only the Appearance of Justice, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 130, 222–62 app. A (1996) (outlining post-Furman statutes).
129 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976).  The new Georgia statute
limited the class of eligible offenders. Id. at 162–63.  It created a bifurcated trial:
in the first phase the jury decided guilt or innocence; and, if the jury returned a
guilty verdict, then the jury decided whether to impose the death penalty or some
lesser sanction. Id. at 163.  To help guide the sentencing determination, Georgia
created a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 163–64.  The
jury must have found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors to return a death sentence. Id. at 164–66.
130 For instance, in Godfrey v. Georgia, the Court invalidated one of the statu-
tory aggravating factors—that the crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
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It also imposed substantive constraints on the presentation of
evidence in capital trials.131  Each of these decisions turned on
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment, as opposed to the due process clause contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Unlike in non-capital cases, the
Eighth Amendment’s super due process clause required
“heightened rationality” of the punishment imposed in death
penalty cases.132  This need for hyper-rationality is a method of
regulating the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory death
sentences earlier in the process—at the level of statutes and
trials, not back-end appellate review.  But it also stretches the
limits of the Court’s competence; from picking apart the precise
language of state statutes to regulating the evidence admissible
in state trials, the Court looked most like a legislature in regu-
lating these processes.
Then, it stopped.  For instance, the Court rejected chal-
lenges to statutory aggravating factors,133 gave the states more
leeway in the evidence that they could introduce during the
penalty phase of the trial,134 and, finally, in 2006, in an opinion
that Justice David Souter called “morally absurd,”135 the
Court, in Kansas v. Marsh, affirmed a state statute that di-
rected the jury to return a death sentence when aggravating
ble or inhuman”—because it was too vague to meet the Eighth Amendment’s
requirement of “rationally reviewable process” in capital cases.  446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980). See also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 346–66 (1988) (stating
that the Oklahoma statutory aggravating factor, a homicide that is “especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment).
131 The Court reversed two death sentences because of improper arguments
that the prosecutor made during oral argument.  In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the
prosecutor improperly implied that the Mississippi Supreme Court, not the jury,
had the ultimate moral responsibility for determining the death penalty.  472 U.S.
320, 328–29 (1985).  In South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court reversed a death
sentence because the prosecutor read a prayer that was found among the belong-
ings of the victim and used it to bolster the impact of the death of the victim.  490
U.S. 805, 811 (1989).
132 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 335 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 In 1993, in Arave v. Creech, the Court affirmed a death sentence based on
an aggravating factor that required the homicide to exhibit “utter disregard for
human life.”  507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993).  The state supreme court held that this
aggravating circumstance meant that the defendant had to be a “cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer.” Id. at 468.  Unlike in Godfrey, the Court held that this factor was
not vague and thus did not run afoul of the heightened reliability standard. Id. at
472.
134 For example, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Court held—reversing course from
Gathers—that victim impact statements are permissible in the penalty phase of a
capital trial.  501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991).
135 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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and mitigating factors are in equipoise.136  Only a decade after
Furman, Professor Robert Weisberg had already noted the
Court’s fading attention to procedural regulation, accusing the
justices of having “reduced the law of the penalty trial to almost
a bare aesthetic exhortation that the states just do some-
thing—anything—to give the penalty trial a legal appear-
ance.”137  Twenty years later, in 2005, Professor Janet Hoeffel
declared that the Court “essentially abandoned a regime of
meaningful guidance.”138  Importantly, Justice Kennedy con-
sistently joined the conservative wing of the Court to hasten the
deregulation of the death penalty.
2. The Shift Away from Case-Specific Proportionality
Review
This section tracks the Court’s retreat from another path-
way through which it protected prisoners against excessive
punishment: case-by-case proportionality review.  Unlike the
procedural regulation approach, proportionality review had the
advantage of being within the Court’s core competency.  In-
deed, the Eighth Amendment envisions that the judiciary pro-
tects against excessive punishment.  However, the case-by-
case approach has the disadvantage of reaching into state
court decisions far more often than decisions that apply to
categories of offenses or categories of offenders, which are nec-
essarily less frequent, broader rulings.
In capital cases, the Court first referenced proportionality
review in Gregg v. Georgia, the case that affirmed the newly
designed death penalty statutes.139  Specifically, the Court
noted with approval that the Georgia statute contained a “pro-
vision for appellate review . . . [that] serves as a check against
the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”140  A
number of state supreme courts implemented this type of pro-
136 Id. at 181 (majority opinion).
137 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 306 (1983)
(describing how the procedural regulations that the Court seemed to promise in
Gregg were more a mirage than an oasis for would-be capital defendants).
138 Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and
Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 781 (2005).
139 See 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (holding that a punishment of death did
not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances).
140 Id. at 206.  Moreover, the Gregg Court noted “the proportionality review
substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by
the action of an aberrant jury.” Id.  The Court even complimented the Georgia
Supreme Court for having “taken its review responsibilities seriously.” Id. at 205.
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portionality review in the 1970s and 1980s.141  However, in
Pulley v. Harris, decided in 1987, the Court held that the fed-
eral Constitution does not compel this review.142  Following
Pulley, most states stopped providing robust comparative case
proportionality review in capital cases.143
In non-capital cases, the Court has only granted relief in
three case-specific challenges to long prison sentences—for a
sentence of “confinement in a penal institution for twelve years
and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, [at]
hard and painful labor,”144 the “use of denationalization as a
punishment,”145 and a life without parole sentence imposed
upon a recidivist offender who uttered a worthless $100 check
where the statutory maximum for a first time offender was five
years of imprisonment.146
In the 1980s and 1990s, though, the Court routinely re-
jected this type of challenge—including for a non-violent recidi-
vist offender whose third and triggering offense for a mandatory
life sentence was “obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses,”147 a
forty-year sentence imposed upon a felon convicted of distrib-
uting nine ounces of marijuana,148 a life without parole sen-
tence imposed upon a first-time offender convicted of
distributing 672 grams of cocaine,149 a twenty-five-year to life
sentence where the triggering offense was the theft of $1197
141 See Bienen, supra note 128, at 131 (explaining that “the majority of state
legislatures and supreme courts . . . believed that Gregg meant what it said . . .
and one important difference would be the requirement of proportionality
review”).
142 See 465 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1987).  By this type, we mean, a comparative case
review, where the appellate court checks to see whether the current case is con-
sistent with other similarly situated cases.  As for the Court’s earlier comments in
Gregg: “We take statutes as we find them,” the Pulley decisions reads, “[t]o en-
dorse a statute as a whole [as the Court did with the Georgia statute in Gregg] is
not to say that anything different is unacceptable.” Id. at 45.
143 See Bienen, supra note 128, at 133 (describing how many states pulled
away from even the appearance of conducting a comparative cases proportionality
review).
144 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
145 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (finding that denationalization
is “a form of punishment more primitive than torture” in that it is the loss of “the
right to have rights”).
146 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983).  Though not a case-by-case
challenge, the Court, in Graham v. Florida, held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposition of a life without parole sentence upon a juvenile offender who
commits a non-homicide offense.  560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  This challenge to a
punishment for a class of offenders, as opposed to case-by-case challenges, was
discussed previously in subpart II.A of this Article.
147 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980).
148 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–71 (1982).
149 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991).
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worth of golf clubs,150 and a twenty-five-year to life sentence
strike where the triggering offense was the theft four videotapes
worth $68.84 from a Kmart store.151  Six of these cases, and all
but one of the cases decided since 1916, were five to four
decisions.152
Justice Kennedy joined with the conservative justices to
reject the challenged excessiveness in each of the cases decided
during his tenure.  Over the past thirty years, moral panic over
crack cocaine and super-predators, among other over-reac-
tions, has contributed to an unprecedented rise in the quantity
and severity of punishment.  Moreover, in the context of the
death penalty, though all indications point to the reality that
there is still no rationality or consistency as to who among the
eligible candidates receive death, the Court has expressly
foresworn the requirement that state and federal courts engage
in case-by-case outcome monitoring.153
It would appear, then, that the Court’s shift away from
procedural regulation and case-by-case proportionality review
is merely a still more profound dereliction of its duty to guard
against a lack of “moderation and restraint” in the legislative
imposition of punishment.  However, over the past fifteen
years, the Court has begun to rely more heavily on a third
approach to guarding against excessive punishments—the cat-
egorical exemption approach.
3. The Shift Toward Categorical Exemptions from
Punishment
As opposed to a case-by-case determination of whether a
punishment is excessive, which is the hallmark of the propor-
tionality cases that we described above, the approach we de-
scribe in this section, the categorical exemption approach,
queries whether a particular punishment practice is excessive
for a broad category of offenses or class of offenders.  At first
blush, it might seem that the categorical approach is more
disruptive of federalism and less sensitive to institutional com-
petency concerns.  But there are more than one million felony
convictions each year.154  A robust case-specific proportional-
150 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
152 The most recent of these cases, Hutto, a summary opinion, was decided six
to three. See 454 U.S. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1984).
154 See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCING IN
STATE COURTS, 2006—SENTENCING TABLES 1 (2009) (reporting 1,132,290 felony con-
victions in state courts alone in 2006).
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ity review jurisprudence could mean hundreds of different
judges assessing the excessiveness of punishments without the
broader perspective of the federal Supreme Court. By contrast,
categorical challenges are rare and destined for the federal Su-
preme Court, usually in the first instance.
The first categorical challenge cases, like the procedural
regulation and case-specific proportionality cases, emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s.  During those decades, the Court held
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment when it is
imposed for the rape of an adult woman that does not result in
death,155 upon an offender who commits felony murder where
the offender “did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to
take life,”156 upon an offender who is insane,157 or upon a
fifteen-year-old offender.158  Conversely, the Court held that
the death penalty is not excessive when it is imposed upon a
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old,159 or upon the intellectually
disabled,160 for felony murder upon a finding of “major partici-
pation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indif-
ference to human life.”161
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in these last two
cases, the first categorical exemption cases decided during his
tenure.162  On categorical challenges, then—as with procedural
regulation and case-specific proportionality review—one might
assume that Kennedy would join the Court’s conservative
block.  But this turned out to be profoundly wrong.  In 2002,
Justice Kennedy joined an opinion barring the execution of
intellectually disabled offenders.163  He then authored opinions
which held that the death penalty is excessive when it is im-
155 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
156 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982).
157 Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
158 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
159 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
160 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339 (1989).
161 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
162 To be clear, the evidence of disproportionality, as assessed under the then-
prevailing approach to the doctrine, was weaker in these cases than in earlier
cases where the Court granted the challenge to the punishment practice. See
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that twenty-seven
states rejected the practice); Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (noting that only one state
rejected the practice).
163 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  Justice Scalia, dissenting,
chastised the majority for concluding that the societal standards of decency had
changed so dramatically over a decade that the Penry decision, which Kennedy
joined, was no longer good law. Id. at 431–33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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posed upon juvenile offenders164 and for non-homicide of-
fenses, including, specifically, the rape of a child.165
Based on his votes rejecting case-specific excessive pun-
ishment claims in three different non-capital cases, observers
would have seemed wise to assume that Justice Kennedy
would side with the conservatives on the idea that “death is
different,” which means that this categorical exemption juris-
prudence is death penalty specific.166  However, in 2010, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote the opinion in Graham v. Florida, which
categorically excluded juvenile offenders who commit non-
homicide offenses from life without the possibility of parole.167
As Justice Clarence Thomas underscored in his dissent in
Graham:
Until today, the Court has based its categorical proportional-
ity rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special
protection to capital defendants because the death penalty is
a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only
those who are “most deserving of execution.” . . . Today’s
decision eviscerates that distinction. “Death is different” no
longer. . . . No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent
the Court from immunizing any class of offenders from the
law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as
well.168
In sum, then, the Court has shifted its attention away from
both regulating the procedural aspects that can result in con-
stitutionally undesirable sentencing outcomes, and monitoring
case-specific outcomes.  However, over the past fifteen years,
the Court has revived and strengthened the categorical exemp-
tion approach to protecting against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.  The next subpart shows that the Court has shifted its
substantive focus away from the monitoring of random or arbi-
trary outcomes and towards curbing retributive excess.
B. The Shift from Policing Randomness to Curbing
Retributive Excess
When it comes to cruel and unusual punishment it is im-
portant to distinguish between two different substantive
goals—consistency and proportionality.  The goal of consis-
tency is an equality goal, which stems from the idea that if two
164 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  Notably, Roper invalidated
Stanford, another opinion Kennedy joined. Id. at 574.
165 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008).
166 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991).
167 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
168 Id. at 102–03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
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people commit the same offense, they should receive the same
punishment.169  In other words, among people who are eligible
for a particular punishment—for instance, the death penalty—
the goal is to avoid an arbitrary or random distribution of
sentences.  The goal of proportionality is to ensure that each
person who receives a punishment is culpable enough to war-
rant it.170  The overriding anxiety here is that a person will be
over-punished—or, in other words, excessively punished.  If
avoiding excessive punishment is the primary goal, then the
question is not who among a class of eligible offenders receives
the harsh punishment, but rather is each person who receives
the punishment culpable enough to be eligible to receive it.
Thus, the excessiveness question is about retributive excess.
In this section, we illustrate how the Court’s Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has shifted its focus away from preventing
randomness in sentencing outcomes and towards curbing re-
tributive excess in the imposition of punishment.
1. The Shift Away from Randomness
Justice Potter Stewart best voiced the randomness concern
in the context of the death penalty when he stated, “For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sen-
tence of death has in fact been imposed.”171  The concern is not
about eligibility for the death penalty, but rather about fairness
in how the punishment is applied.  When the Court upheld the
post-Furman death penalty it did so expressly because the new
169 See Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1161
(2015); see also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that “consistency . . . requires that
the death penalty be inflicted evenhandedly”).
170 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (“Embodied in the Constitu-
tion’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of justice that pun-
ishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.’” (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (alterations omitted))).
171 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan’s Furman concurrence echoed the same theme: “When the pun-
ishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally
available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrar-
ily.  Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.” Id. at 293 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).  Justice White, too, found the death penalty to be constitutionally
untenable where there remained “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
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statutes eliminated any “substantial risk that [the punishment]
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”172
By the late 1980s, however, the Court seemed to sour on
the randomness rationale.  In Pulley v. Harris, the Court pro-
vided one reason why the Eighth Amendment did not require
comparative case proportionality review in capital cases: “This
sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence
is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense,”
but rather queries “whether the penalty is nonetheless unac-
ceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the
punishment imposed on others convicted of the same
crime.”173  Shortly thereafter, the Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp,
brushed off the idea that the Court should care about consis-
tency in any careful sense, calling any “discrepancy” that a
study showing racially disparate outcomes presented “a far cry
from the major systemic defects identified in Furman,” and re-
casting its prior cases as finding “that constitutional guaran-
tees are met when the mode for determining guilt or
punishment itself has been surrounded with safeguards to
make it as fair as possible.”174
2. The Shift Toward Curbing Retributive Excess
This section describes the shift towards a greater emphasis
on ensuring that punishments do not suffer from retributive
excess.  Again, unlike randomness, the concern over retribu-
tive excess is that the offender possesses insufficient culpabil-
ity to warrant the degree of punishment in question.
Excessiveness is a concept measured in relation to retribu-
tion, which “reflects society’s and the victim’s interests in see-
ing that the offender is repaid for the hurt he caused.”175
Retribution is at the core of the criminal law—enjoying the
172 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).
173 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).
174 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
175 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008).  As Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court in Atkins explained: “The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohib-
its ‘excessive’ sanctions . . . it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense . . . [t]hus, even though
imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual, it may not be imposed as a penalty for the ‘status’ of narcotic
addiction, because such a sanction would be excessive. As Justice Stewart ex-
plained in Robinson [v. California]: ‘Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.’”  Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations
omitted) (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
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support of legal scholars and philosophers, judges, and the lay
intuitions of the American people.176  Nonetheless, it is also the
punishment goal “that most often can contradict the law’s own
ends” and violate “the constitutional commitment to decency
and restraint.”177  This tendency towards retributive excess
has two main drivers.  First, as Justice Brennan put the point,
“[t]hose whom we would banish from society or from the
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to be
heard above society’s demand for punishment.”178  Second, in
times of moral panic, when fear and anger prevail, it is difficult
to calibrate retribution.
When legislatures go too far, it is the role of the Court to
provide a check.  Recall from Weems, though, the 1910 case
involving the disbursement officer in the Philippines, that the
Court understood the validity of “different exercises of legisla-
tive judgment,” which fell outside the ambit of the Eighth
Amendment, but claimed for itself the right to guard against
“unrestrained” legislative power.179  Eighty years later, Justice
Kennedy, concurring in a decision rejecting a challenge to a
sentence of life imprisonment for a drug offense, reiterated that
proportionality is a “narrow” principle that “forbids only ex-
treme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
176 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The instinct
for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law.”); H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles
of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 7 (2008) (“Retribution, defined
simply as the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally
guilty, may figure among the conceivable justifying aims of a system of punish-
ment.”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1991) (“If . . . he has committed a murder he must die.  Here there is no substitute
that will satisfy justice.  There is no similarity between life, however wretched it
may be, and death, hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution
unless death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer . . . .”); Chad Flanders,
Can Retributivism be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309, 309 (2014) (“Retributive
theory has long held pride of place among theories of criminal punishment in both
philosophy and in law.”).
177 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420.  A vocal minority of the Court including, most
ferociously, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, recoil at the notion that the
Eighth Amendment is a protection against retributively disproportionate punish-
ment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“In my view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment contains no proportionality principle.”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 974 (1991) (finding “it most unlikely that the English Cruell and Unusuall
Punishments Clause was meant to forbid ‘disproportionate’ punishments” and
noting “even less likelihood that proportionality of punishment was one of the
traditional ‘rights and privileges of Englishmen’ apart from the Declaration of
Rights, which happened to be included in the Eighth Amendment”).
178 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
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crime.”180  In other words, as the Weems Court expressed, the
Eighth Amendment is not concerned with legislative discretion,
but rather only serious legislative overreach.181  The Court
later adopted Kennedy’s concurrence,182 which means that
current jurisprudence does recognize some retributive con-
straint on non-capital punishments.  Nonetheless, in the three
case-specific non-capital proportionality cases decided during
his tenure, Justice Kennedy did not vote to invalidate any of
the respective sentences.183
In our view, this outcome reveals less about retribution
than it does about an aversion to case-specific proportionality
review.  However, a reasonable observer analyzing Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinions in Eighth Amendment cases between when he
joined the Court in 1987 through 2003 when he voted to reject
the last of the case-specific proportionality cases, could not be
faulted for assuming that Justice Kennedy—along with the
other conservative members of the Court—favored neither a
focus on randomness nor a robust commitment to curbing re-
tributive excess.
This all changed, though, alongside the rise in importance
of the categorical exemption approach.  Under this doctrine,
which encompasses six cases over the past fifteen years, Jus-
tice Kennedy—and the Court—has focused on curbing retribu-
tive excess in three different senses.184  First, the punishment
must not be retributively extravagant relative to the offense.
For instance, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the case challenging the
death penalty for the rape of a child, Justice Kennedy’s major-
ity opinion explained that “[t]he incongruity between the crime
of child rape and the harshness of the death penalty poses
risks of overpunishment.”185
Second, a punishment must not be excessive relative to the
culpability of the offender.  For example, in Roper v. Simmons,
180 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 959 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 See id. at 998–99.
182 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23–24.
183 See id. at 13; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003); Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 960.
184 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty
for intellectually disabled offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005)
(barring the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 446–47 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional for non-
homicide offenses); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that life
without the possibility of parole is an excessive punishment for a juvenile who
commits a non-homicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475
(2012) (barring mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders); Hall v. Flor-
ida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (applying the Atkins decision).
185 554 U.S. at 441–42.
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the Court, with Kennedy at the helm, underscored that “[f]rom
a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists
that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”186
Thus, “[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthi-
ness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth
and immaturity.”187
The third sense in which the Court has elevated the impor-
tance of curbing retributive excess is a point adjacent to the
last point.  Namely, the Court has elevated the notion that ret-
ribution in terms of moral culpability is not solely a backward-
looking enterprise.  For example, in Graham v. Florida, the
Court, underscoring that few, if any, juveniles possess an “irre-
trievably depraved character,”188 focused on the idea that chil-
dren change, often profoundly so.189  The Court stated that,
“By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community,
the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s
value and place in society.  This judgment is not appropriate in
light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change
and limited moral culpability.”190  Thus, in additional to crime
specific calculations of desert, the Court’s categorical exemp-
tion cases focus on both the culpability of the transgressor at
the time of the offense and the possibility that she or he will be
redeemed over time.
The move towards a more robust purposive focus on retrib-
utive excess compliments the move towards the categorical ex-
emption approach to deciding Eighth Amendment questions.
But how does the Court know whether a punishment is exces-
sive?  The next subpart illustrates that the Court has shifted its
methods for answering that critical question.
C. The Move to a Functional Assessment of Societal
Standard of Decency
In categorical exemption cases, especially the few decided
in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Court turns to “objective
186 543 U.S. at 570.  Juveniles, the Court explained, have a “susceptibility” to
“immature and irresponsible behavior,” a “vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings,” and their “struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime com-
mitted by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Id.
187 Id. at 571.
188 560 U.S. at 68.
189 See id. at 72–73.
190 Id. at 74.
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indicia”191 of societal consensus to glean whether the punish-
ment in question comports with contemporary norms, it reads
as though that inquiry is an end in itself.  However, along with
the rise in retributive excess as the purpose of the categorical
exemption approach, it has become increasingly clear that the
goal of considering objective indicators of societal standards is
to glean whether the punishment is in fact retributively exces-
sive.  Unsurprisingly, then, in recent cases, the Court has
moved towards a more robust, functional assessment of socie-
tal standards.
The early categorical challenge cases relied heavily on leg-
islative enactments as the measure for societal consensus.  For
example, in Coker, the Court invalidated the death penalty for
the rape of an adult woman where only Georgia permitted the
practice.192  Conversely, in Stanford, the Court rejected a chal-
lenge to juvenile executions where twenty-seven states barred
the death penalty for juveniles (with only twelve of thirty-seven
capital punishment states barring the death penalty for seven-
teen-year-old, as opposed to sixteen-year-old, offenders).193
This focus on state legislative enactments made good sense if
one believes that legislatures make rational decisions based
upon the preferences of state citizens.  If any new modes of
punishment, such as a return of the thumbscrew, happened to
slip through a legislature, they would be judged against the
broad sweep of history and the judgment of the state legisla-
tures collectively.  But this static approach does not fit well
with the idea of the Eighth Amendment as a protection against
moral panic.  The moral panics that fueled changes to drug
laws and juvenile sentencing in the wake of the crack epidemic
and the super-predator scare resulted from legislators, who
along with their constituents, got swept up in the moment.194
191 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
192 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).  Moreover, in Enmund, the
Court counted forty-two states that legislatively barred the death penalty for a
person who “somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder
was committed” under circumstances “where a defendant did not take life, at-
tempt to take it, or intend to take life.”  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792–93
(1982).
193 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Moreover, when the panic recedes, there are serious difficulties in passing
justice reform that repeals the harshness of sentences for serious offenses.  First,
an aberrational prisoner who is released early may reoffend, and legislators may
worry about the public’s lack of context or risk-savvy.  Second, perversely, when it
comes to long-term disuse of a punishment practice, it may be difficult to get the
issue on the legislative agenda.
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The Court’s decisions over the past fifteen years, and espe-
cially since 2010, are more sensitive to the realities of legisla-
tive excess than the rigid approach of bean counting state
legislative enactments to determine societal tolerance for a
punishment practice.  For example, in Atkins, the Court ex-
plained that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.”195  Significant trend evidence is more sensitive to the
realities of legislation than a count of the absolute number of
states that legislatively prohibit a punishment.  This is so be-
cause anti-crime legislation is difficult to pass due to the lack of
a powerful lobby, the risk of being labeled soft on crime, and
the possibility that a statistical outlier case results in a violent
crime.196
Another doctrinal development that increased the robust-
ness of the inquiry into prevailing societal norms is a focus on
the importance of on-the-ground usage indicators for detecting
whether a punishment practice is retributively extravagant.
The Coker Court noted that juries rejected the death penalty in
at least 90% of Georgia capital rape cases.197  But, on the
whole, jury verdicts felt like a ride-along element of the legisla-
tive enactment analysis as opposed to an independent consid-
eration.  However, in Graham, the Court transformed on-the-
ground usage data from a sideshow into the main event.198
Three-quarters of the states and the federal government for-
mally authorized life without parole for juvenile offenders;199
nonetheless, in finding a societal rejection of the practice, the
Court relied on the exceedingly infrequent resort to the punish-
ment.  Indeed, “nationwide there [were] only [123] juvenile of-
fenders serving sentences of life without parole for
nonhomicide offenses.”200  This usage number is more compel-
ling than legislative judgments because it illustrates that “in
195 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
196 See id. at 315–16 (“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is
far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of vio-
lent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally re-
tarded persons . . . provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.”).
197 433 U.S. at 597.
198 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63–67 (2010).
199 See id. at 62 (noting that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government authorize juvenile sentences of life without parole).
200 Id. at 62–63.  The Court reached this number by adding the 109 juvenile
offenders accounted for in a study to an additional fourteen excluded from the
study that the Court was able to count independently. Id. at 64.
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proportion to the opportunities for its imposition, life without
parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
crimes” were an exceedingly rare punishment.201
If the sentence is exceedingly rare relative to its availability,
then there is good reason to believe that the hysteria has fizzled
out.  This is true because when it comes to the actual imposi-
tion of a punishment, unlike legislatures or public opinion
polls, real cases involve real people forced to make difficult
moral determinations.  A major contributor to retributive ex-
travagance, especially in the midst of moral panics, is a dehu-
manization of the perpetrators of crime.202  A person who
commits a homicide becomes a wild beast.  A teenager becomes
a super-predator.  But a super-predator as an abstraction is
one thing.  A fourteen-year-old kid, in the flesh, with the con-
text of the crime and the story of that kid’s life at hand, is
another.
An additional factor that Court has emphasized recently is
the extreme geographic isolation of punishment practice.  For
example, in Graham, Florida alone accounted for 77 of the 123
life without parole sentences nationally—and only ten other
states had a juvenile serving life without parole.203  The degree
of geographic isolation provides further context to the stan-
dards of decency inquiry because it asks how much of the
sentencing activity in question is explained by a few outlier
jurisdictions—states or counties—as opposed to being evenly
distributed across the nation.
The point here is not an arbitrariness point—namely, that
there is an unfairness when an eligible defendant who lives in Y
county receives the challenged punishment when a similarly
situated defendant in X county does not receive the challenged
punishment.  Instead, the point is that it is difficult to justify
the retributive necessity of the challenged punishment if most
eligible defendants in most counties within a state (or states
within the country) do not receive it.  In other words, extreme
outlier usage by a particular office in a particular county tends
to say more about that county (and probably less about the
residents than the prosecutor’s office or individual prosecutors)
201 Id. at 66.
202 See Robert J. Smith et al., The Racial Architecture of Retribution: An
Empircal Study of 500 Jury Eligible Citizens 17–19 (Mar. 2, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with author) (describing how dehumanization occurs in
the criminal justice system, and how anger and fear also ratchet up the panic and
punishment).
203 560 U.S. at 64.
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than it does about the standards of decency of the nation as a
whole.
Taken together, infrequency of imposition and geographic
isolation are very important tools for gauging societal stan-
dards.  Again, if a sentence is imposed infrequently or in a
geographically isolated pattern, that is an important sign that
the punishment is not necessary—for, if the punishment were
necessary to achieve a retributive purpose, wouldn’t it be im-
posed routinely and evenly?
Finally, in Hall v. Florida, the Court displayed flexibility in
how it describes the status of states as retaining a punishment
practice.  Instead of simply counting legislative enactments
from years—or, more often, decades ago, the Court counted
Oregon as a death penalty abolitionist state because the gover-
nor “suspended the death penalty” and the state had “executed
only two individuals in the past 40 years.”204  The Court, with
Justice Kennedy authoring the opinion, also described why
some of the other states that formally retained an IQ cutoff for
intellectual disability claims (the practice at issue in Hall)
should not count as fully part of the retentionist jurisdictions:
Kansas has not had an execution in almost five decades, and
so its laws and jurisprudence on this issue are unlikely to
receive attention on this specific question.  Delaware has exe-
cuted three individuals in the past decade, while Washington
has executed one person, and has recently suspended its
death penalty.  None of the four individuals executed recently
in those States appears to have brought a claim similar to
that advanced here.205
In sum, the Court has moved away from a wooden, constrained
approach for detecting social norms to a more flexible, robust
approach to answering the precise question—do societal stan-
dards indicate that this punishment meaningfully contributes
to the need for retribution?  In other words, this more func-
tional, sophisticated accounting of societal standards permits a
more accurate determination of retributive excess; and, in
turn, that more accurate determination of retributive excess
facilitates the Court’s move to more substantive and categorical
Eighth Amendment interventions.
In the next Part, we take a step back and query what is
driving the Court, and especially Justice Kennedy, towards this
more robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Rather than a
new gloss on a contested historical debate over the exact mean-
204 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).
205 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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ing of the Eighth Amendment, or a closer textual read of the
words in the statute, Justice Kennedy, as the next Part shows,
is motivated by the deeper liberty and dignity principles that
undergird the Eighth Amendment.  For Justice Kennedy, the
doctrine should align as neatly as possible with the goal of
assessing whether a punishment practice fails to meaningfully
contribute to some lawful retributive goal.  It is this overarching
commitment to liberty, one that we describe more closely in the
next Part, that inspired the reshaping of the Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in ways that spotlight retributive excess
and glean from society in as much detail as possible the con-
temporary standards of decency.
III
LIBERTY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
This Part is concerned with extracting and articulating
what is animating the shift in the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.  This Part suggests that, in its aggregation, the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence presents an evolving
conception of constitutional liberty that has driven, and contin-
ues to drive, the Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrinal develop-
ments.  We recognize that in reaching this conclusion we face
the potential criticism of interpretive overreach—that is, extra-
polating a significant general (and generalizable) principle from
a small sample of cases in a limited context.  However, it turns
out that the Court has made similar shifts from narrow and
wooden doctrinal determinations to broader individual liberty
determinations in the context of other constitutional rights,
specifically in its substantive due process jurisprudence.
The developing concept of constitutional liberty, then, can
be understood as an exercise in symbiotic constitutional bor-
rowing, whereby the Court has quietly but actively imported
substantive due process (and vice-versa) ideas in order to
transform the Eighth Amendment  and realign its protections
with “prevailing community sentiments or experience.”206  The
consequence of this symbiotic constitutional borrowing is that
the transformation of the Eighth Amendment doctrine is sub-
stantially aligned with the shifts in the substantive due process
jurisprudence as it relates to marriage.  Drawing on the ascen-
206 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV.
459, 478 (2010) (explaining that this type of borrowing, or “displacement,” pur-
sues a “goal of ensuring that the imported ideas eventually come to dominate
prevalent ideas and restructure the relationships among governing constitutional
norms”).
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dency of constitutional liberty in the marriage doctrine as we
explicate the principle of constitutional liberty, then, can fore-
tell to some degree the likely direction of the Court’s developing
Eighth Amendment doctrine.207
As a first order issue, we must define this idea of constitu-
tional liberty.  By constitutional liberty we refer to the core of
the deep values undergirding constitutional rights, as recog-
nized by the Court.  A “spacious phrase,” liberty includes the
freedom to maintain “a zone of liberty, a zone of protection, a
line that is drawn where the individual can tell the Govern-
ment: Beyond this line you may not go.”208  It also includes
“certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity.”209  For instance,
the reach of constitutional liberty includes at least the specific
right of marriage and the right to parental choice in raising a
child.210  And in its protection of these things and more, the
value of liberty promotes and protects human dignity itself, or,
in other words, the intrinsic worth of every human being.211
Justice Kennedy, who is at the helm of the liberty-based
evolution of both the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
the substantive fundamental rights doctrine, treats these
terms liberty and dignity as near synonyms, two words that
cast light from different angles to express the full meaning of
207 In addition, it adds legitimacy to our observations, as well as the doctrinal
path outlined by Kennedy more generally. See id. at 478–79 (noting that efforts to
apply equality ideas to the religion clauses in the past two decades have “pro-
duced a dramatic reordering of expectations as to the scope of rights and institu-
tional obligations such that one could say that, for better or worse, the analytical
frameworks and vocabulary associated with equality have largely displaced earlier
readings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses”).
208 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 86 (statement of Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy).
209 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
210 See id. at 2598–99 (2015) (“The nature of injustice is that we may not
always see it in our own times.  The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its mean-
ing.”); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children . . . .  The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”).
211 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
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the core concept that the Constitution aims to protect.212  For
example, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court described the right
to marry one’s same-sex partner as an “ask for equal dignity in
the eyes of the law.”213  As Professor Lawrence Tribe recently
explained, “The language of dignity is not accidental,” indeed,
“the concept of dignity is central to contemporary human rights
discourse . . . [and] also has deep roots in the Christian notion
of grace, extended to all humanity in equal measure.”214  This
liberty principle requires “governmental actions [to] pass far
more stringent tests when they impinge upon liberty in ways
that demean the individual,”215 for instance, in ways that “neg-
atively affect[ ] a person’s dignity.”216
This base value of liberty is understandably most visible in
the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
jurisprudence, specifically as relating to the rights of same-sex
couples.217  This body of law, which began to evolve shortly
after Justice Kennedy’s arrival on the court, reached its cres-
cendo last June with the decision in Obergefell.218  There, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote, “The Constitution promises liberty to all
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity.”219  For Kennedy, “liberties extend to certain per-
sonal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, in-
cluding intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs,” and “[c]hoices about marriage shape an individual’s
destiny.”220
212 Harvard Law School, Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy
Visits HLS, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHbMP
nA5n0Q [https://perma.cc/HHA7-SNPH].
213 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
214 Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F.
16, 20 (2015).
215 HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY
ON LIBERTY 5 (2009).
216 Id.
217 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (hold-
ing that the federal government’s definition of marriage as a heterosexual union
was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to individuals in state-recognized
same-sex marriages); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking
down a Texas sodomy law and thus legalizing same-sex acts throughout the
United States); see also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v.
Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 169–70 (2015) (describing Justice Kennedy’s
methodology of deploying the “argot of liberty” to address substantive due process
questions in Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence).
218 See Yoshino, supra note 217, at 148 (explaining that Obergefell became a R
“game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence” by placing a strong
emphasis on the “intertwined nature of liberty and equality”).
219 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
220 Id. at 2597–99.
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This clear identification of the importance of liberty as driv-
ing the majority’s decision making in Obergefell is the product
of a slow and incremental development in the Court’s substan-
tive due process jurisprudence.221  With roots in Justice
Harlan’s seminal dissent in Poe v. Ullman,222 under Kennedy’s
formulation the value of constitutional liberty originates from
the premise that, as a nation, we have recognized the need for
respecting the liberty of all individuals.  Justice Harlan’s con-
ception of liberty directs courts to see liberty not as “any
formula,” but instead a weighted measure that protects a per-
son from unwanted governmental intrusions.223
This conception of a liberty formula refers to the deeply
contested divide on the Court over how the Court was to deter-
mine which rights were fundamental liberty rights pursuant to
the substantive due process clause.  On the one hand is
Justice Harlan’s (and Justice Kennedy’s) broad and inclusive
conception of liberty; an approach that Professor Tribe de-
scribes as “universally accessible [and] nontechnical” in its
prose.224  On the other is the “wooden three-prong test focused
on tradition, specificity, and negativity,” best articulated by a
majority of the Court in the 1997 case of Washington v. Gluck-
sberg.225  Under this limited approach, fundamental rights are
cabined by backward-looking and narrow conceptions of lib-
erty, an approach that resulted in the Court declining to extend
Fourteenth Amendment liberty to, for example, the right to
die.226
221 See generally Tribe, supra note 214, at 16 (“[Obergefell] represents the R
culmination of a decades-long project that has revolutionized the Court’s funda-
mental rights jurisprudence.”); Yoshino, supra note 217 (arguing that Obergefell R
was a conclusion of a doctrinal evolution that places antisubordination concerns
at the center of a due process analysis).
222 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The majority’s adoption
of the opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey has given Justice Harlan’s dissent
precedential weight.  505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992).
223 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
224 Tribe, supra note 214, at 23. R
225 Id. at 16.  The Glucksberg Court required that a right be “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition” as well as “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” to be recognized as a due process liberty.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 201 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).  Additionally, the Court demanded a “careful description” of the
claimed right. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).  Finally, the
Court implied a restriction to negative—or “freedom from”—rights. See id. at
719–20 (noting that the Due Process Clause protects “against government inter-
ference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests”).
226 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06 (holding that a state law prohibition
against being the “cause” of or providing “aid” to a person attempting suicide is
not a due process clause violation).
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With its roots in the seminal 2003 opinion of Lawrence v.
Texas,227 Justice Kennedy has incrementally dismantled
Washington v. Glucksberg’s limited approach to calibrating
constitutional liberty in the context of gay rights.228  In Law-
rence, Kennedy clearly signaled his intentions from the outset
in an opinion striking down a Texas law prohibiting homosex-
ual sodomy.  In the first line of the opinion Kennedy wrote,
“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government in-
trusions into a dwelling or other private places.”229  He contin-
ued, “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.”230  Repudiating the Court’s prior decision in the sim-
ilar case of Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court upheld a
Georgia law forbidding same-sex sodomy,231  Kennedy stated
that the Bowers Court failed “to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake.”232  For Kennedy, the Bowers Court’s calibra-
tion of the interest at stake as a right to homosexual sodomy
was too narrow, distracting the Court from the fundamental
liberty at stake, namely the right to engage in, and set the
boundaries of, human relationships and intimate conduct
within those relationships.233
227 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that under the
due process clause a state cannot criminalize consensual intercourse between
two people of the same sex).
228 Scholars consider the set of relevant cases to include at least Windsor,
Lawrence, Bowers v. Hardwick, Obergefell, but potentially reaching back to Lov-
ing as the foundational case on marriage. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 214, at 22, R
31 (“The importance of this idea [of constitutional liberty] to Justice Kennedy’s
jurisprudence has been most apparent in the gay-rights triptych of Lawrence v.
Texas, United States v. Windsor, and now Obergefell”); Yoshino, supra note 217, at R
170 (“In previous cases, such as Lawrence, Casey, and Windsor, [Justice Ken-
nedy] relied heavily on the notion of ‘dignity.’  While Obergefell makes repeated
reference to dignity, it focuses more on the concept of liberty.”); see also Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (expressing the view that liberty and
equality are interconnected); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–96
(2013) (recognizing same-sex marriages where made lawful by the states on prin-
ciples of both federalism and liberty). Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191–92 (1986) (denying protection to same-sex acts under the due process
clause either as a right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or as one “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79
(omitting specificity and tradition from due process analysis and explaining that
the Founders had crafted the Constitution to allow future generations to “invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom”).
229 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
230 Id.
231 478 U.S. at 196.
232 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
233 See id. at 574 (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education. . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship
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With this, Kennedy signaled that liberty, and the synony-
mous concept of dignity,234 was something more than a list of
discrete activities.  Instead, the constitutional promise of lib-
erty embodies a concept of human good that enables the citi-
zenry to “define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”235  By the time
of the Court’s decision in Obergefell, then, Kennedy fully em-
braced the value of constitutional liberty not only as formative
for the scope of investigation of fundamental rights, but as an
end goal in and of itself.  As Kennedy noted, “while Lawrence
confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to
engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does
not follow that freedom stops there.  Outlaw to outcast may be
a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of lib-
erty.”236  Liberty, then, is both formative and conclusory; a
starting point and the goal.
Critically, this transition from liberty as a guide for assess-
ing the means by which the Court determined whether a right
was fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment to an in-
dependent ends against which alleged government infractions
are measured, is mirrored in Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence.  As noted in Part II, at the time Justice Kennedy joined
the Court, the Eighth Amendment doctrine could best be de-
scribed as wooden, formalistic, and overly bound to historical
tradition.237
While we have already discussed the Court’s incremental
rejection of a narrow and formulaic approach to the Eighth
Amendment in Part II, it is valuable to note here the rhetorical
shift in the jurisprudence after Kennedy’s confirmation.  What
we see in these cases is an elevation of the value of liberty (or,
as it is sometimes referred to, dignity) in the categorical exemp-
tion cases.
This premise of constitutional liberty as guiding the
Court’s decision making can be seen overtly in the 2005 case of
Roper v. Simmons.  There, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, noted that the drafters of the Constitution included
“broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.  The
decision in Bowers would deny them this right.”).
234 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 214, at 17 (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s ap- R
proach to the concept of dignity as it interconnects with rights and equality).
235 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
236 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
237 See supra notes 139–53.
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human dignity,” amongst those the Eighth Amendment prohi-
bition on cruel and unusual punishments.238  In Roper, the
Court held that while the state is permitted to “exact forfeiture
of some of the most basic liberties” from juvenile offenders
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment places a
restriction upon the government such that “the State cannot
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature under-
standing of his own humanity.”239  Similarly, in Graham v. Flor-
ida, in the context of life without parole for a juvenile who
committed a non-homicide offense, the Court again framed the
question in terms of how legislative excess needlessly deprived
the prisoner of the full promise of liberty.  There the Court
stated, “The State does not execute the offender sentenced to
life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by
a forfeiture that is irrevocable.  It deprives the convict of the
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration . . . .”240
As the Court in Atkins v. Virginia explained, “The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.”241
Drawing on this evolving value of constitutional liberty
(and the synonymous value of dignity), the Court has increas-
ingly undertaken a more expansive assessment of the limits of
legislative imposition of punishment.  In Hall v. Florida, Justice
Kennedy noted that through “protecting even those convicted
of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of
the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”242  Put-
ting this principle into action, the Court in Hall reiterated its
holding from Atkins that though intellectually disabled persons
sometimes commit aggravated homicides, “to impose the
harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person
violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being.”243
Importantly for Kennedy, in interpreting the boundaries of
liberty, the line between the liberty “to do” and the liberty to
“not have done to,” is not fixed.  This “spacious phrase,” liberty,
is not fastened to the policies and practices of past genera-
tions.244  Instead, liberty is a concept that continues to unfold
238 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
239 Id. at 573–74.
240 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010).
241 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
242 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
243 Id.
244 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 86 (Statement of Anthony M. Ken-
nedy); see also, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The
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in our own time.  Justice Kennedy said during his confirmation
hearings that, “what the framers had in mind was to rise above
their own injustices,” therefore “[i]t would serve no purpose to
have a Constitution which simply enacted the status quo.”245
Yet, he went on: “To say that new generations yield new in-
sights and new perspectives does not mean the Constitution
changes.  It just means that our understanding of it
changes.”246  Nor does it “mean that moral principles have not
remained the same.”247  It just means that “it sometimes takes
humans generations to become aware of the moral conse-
quences, or the immoral consequences, of their own
conduct.”248
Putting this in the context of the Eighth Amendment, then,
the claims in Atkins and Simmons were not that the Eighth
Amendment barred the execution of juveniles or intellectually
disabled offenders at the time of the Amendment’s enactment.
Instead, the claim was that the interconnected liberty and dig-
nity interests that undergird the Amendment are “spacious
phrase[s]”249 and their full meaning unfolds over time as soci-
ety learns, grows, and matures. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Jus-
tice Kennedy, writing for the Court, perfectly captured this
concept of evolving liberty: “Evolving standards of decency
must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person,
and the punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.”250
Thus, “[i]t is an established principle that decency, in its es-
sence, presumes respect for the individual and thus modera-
tion or restraint in the application of . . . punishment.”251
In other words, with knowledge and experience, society
understands more fully the consequences of its collective ac-
tions; to say that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and
so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all per-
sons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578–79 (2003) (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth amendment known the components of liberty
in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  They did not
presume to have this insight. . . . As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”).
245 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 152 (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy).
246 Id. at 230.
247 Id. at 153.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 86 (explaining that such phrases invoke a zone of protection).
250 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).
251 Id. at 435.
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for that experience to be imported into the protections against
liberty misunderstands the enterprise of crafting an enduring
Bill of Rights.  The Court made this point powerfully in Hall:
“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the Na-
tion we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire
to be.  This is to affirm that the Nation’s constant, unyielding
purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its
precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force.”252
Further, it is the role of the judiciary to interpret what the
value of liberty means today as applied to contemporary prac-
tices and mores, in light of our historical experience.253  It is
the judiciary, then, that must draw that line that demarcates
the outer bounds of liberty; for Justice Kennedy, “[i]t is waver-
ing; it is amorphous; it is uncertain.  But this is the judicial
function.”254  As a practical matter, then, “the great question in
constitutional law,” according to Justice Kennedy, is: “One,
where is that line drawn? And, two, what are the principles that
you refer to in drawing that line?”255  Justice Kennedy, during
his confirmation hearing, said that judges should use “history,
the case law, and our understanding of the American constitu-
tional tradition in order to determine the intention of the docu-
ment broadly expressed,”256 yet he also agreed with the second
Justice Harlan that this enterprise does not involve “mechani-
cal yardsticks” or “mechanical answers,” but rather the exer-
cise of both “judgment and restraint.”257
In other words, it is the role of the judiciary to guard
against legislative extravagance—to ensure that the laws
passed through the democratic process do not end up “trans-
gressing the constitutional commitment to decency and re-
straint.”258  It is the role of the judiciary both to determine
“whether or not liberty extends to situations not previously
addressed by the courts, to protections not previously an-
nounced by the courts”259 and to gauge whether restrictions on
252 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
253 See supra subpart I.B.




257 Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chair, S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary); accord id. (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy) (agreeing with Justice Harlan’s
interpretation as posed by then-Senator Biden).
258 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
259 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 87 (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy).
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liberty—particularly in the context of punishment—remain
necessary in kind and degree.
Justice Kennedy believes this approach “is consistent with
the idea that constitutional values are intended to endure from
generation to generation and from age to age.”260  As Justice
Kennedy has noted,
It was not the political branches of the government that de-
cided Brown v. Board of Education.  It was not the political
branches of the government that wrought the resolution of
Baker v. Carr, the apportionment decision, or that decided
the right of counsel case in Gideon v. Wainwright.  It was the
courts.261
This is an approach that places the judiciary at the heart of
understanding and preserving liberty as a stable moral concept
that progresses in its particular demands over time.  For Jus-
tice Kennedy, the drafters of the Constitution meant for the
document to apply to “exigencies and circumstances and per-
haps even crises that they could never foresee.”262  This does
not mean that judges are free to import their own values or
biases to resolve constitutional disputes.  “This is not the aris-
tocracy of the robe,” then-Judge Kennedy cautioned during his
confirmation hearings.263  “Judges are not to make laws; they
are to enforce the laws.”264  Instead, “the idea is that the Con-
stitution is itself a law,” “[i]t is a document that must be fol-
lowed.”265  And thus, “judges must be bound by some neutral,
definable, measurable standard in their interpretation of the
Constitution.”266  The standard that has emerged is liberty.
With this understanding of the Court’s fundamental shift
to, and embracing of, the value of constitutional liberty, and its
role in driving the doctrinal shifts in both the Eighth Amend-
ment and substantive due process clause, we turn now to high-
light two specific lessons from the Court’s most recent
substantive due process decision—Obergefell.  As suggested
above, given the symbiotic borrowing between these two provi-
260 Id. at 140.
261 Id. at 100 (statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (quoting from a 1978 speech by Anthony M. Kennedy).
262 Id. at 139 (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy).
263 Id. at 138.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 140.
266 Id. at 138.  Fittingly, then, Professor Michael Dorf, a former Kennedy clerk,
said of the Justice that he is “probably the most confident of all the justices in the
court’s power.” HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M.
KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 5 (2009) (quoting Richard Brust, The Man in the Middle, 89
A.B.A. J. 24, 25 (2003)).
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sions, these observations are instructive for the Court’s poten-
tial vision of a robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
First. In Part II, we described how the Court has taken a
more functional approach to gauging societal norms in the
most recent Eighth Amendment cases.  For example, the Court
has gauged actual sentencing practice, the level of geographic
isolation that the punishment reflects,267 and whether a state
that retains a punishment is nonetheless “de facto” abolitionist
due to a combination of long-term and prospective disuse (the
latter of which, in Hall, was signaled by gubernatorial imposed
moratoria on executions).268  Yet, in the context of the substan-
tive due process clause, the Court takes an even more sophisti-
cated approach to assessing societal standards of decency.  In
Obergefell the Court stated:
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grass-
roots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books,
and other popular and scholarly writings.  There has been
extensive litigation in state and federal courts.  Judicial opin-
ions addressing the issue have been informed by the conten-
tions of parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more
general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its
meaning that has occurred over the past decades.  As more
than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central
institutions in American life—state and local governments,
the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, relig-
ious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, profes-
sional organizations, and universities—have devoted
substantial attention to the question.  This has led to an
enhanced understanding of the issue—an understanding re-
flected in the arguments now presented for resolution as a
matter of constitutional law.269
Through the lens of Obergefell the function of consulting
objective indicia begins to look like the equivalent of civil dis-
covery.  The Court is drawing on a broader set of information
from a more diverse set of sources.  This, then, arguably pro-
vides the Court with a greater opportunity to detect whether its
own intuitions on the question of excessive punishment ade-
quately reflect the tapestry of norms that comprise the current
standards of decency.
Specifically, though, as we discuss in Part IV, this broader
conception of the appropriate sources for the Court to consult
267 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–64 (2010).
268 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).
269 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (internal citation
omitted).
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could prove illuminative in cases, unlike the death penalty,
where the punishments the Court confronts does not benefit
from juror (or even judicial) input.270  In those cases, for exam-
ple in the context of mandatory minimum sentences or extreme
prison conditions, these sources could help to guard against
increasingly subjective judgment on the one hand or forced
inaction on the other.
Second. The right to marry has been at the core of sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence since the Court’s 1967 de-
cision in Loving v. Virginia.271  In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, focuses on the inequality of permitting
one type of couple the dignity to marry (for instance, the inter-
racial couple in Loving) while denying that right to another type
of couple (same-sex couples).272  However, the Court did not
perform a separate equal protection analysis to give substance
to the inequality concerns.  Instead, in a move that Professor
Tribe refers to as the creation of the “equal dignity” doctrine,273
Justice Kennedy simply explained:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth indepen-
dent principles.  Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured
by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are
not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.  In any
particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the
essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive
way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identifica-
tion and definition of the right.274
This equal dignity concept is incredibly important in the
context of the Eighth Amendment.  For instance, while execut-
ing an intellectually disabled person would violate his “inherent
270 See infra subpart IV.B.
271 See 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
272 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (“As the State itself makes marriage all
the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status
has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important re-
spects. . . . The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the
fundamental right to marry is now manifest.” (citations omitted)).
273 Tribe, supra note 214, at 17.
274 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03.
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dignity as a human being,”275 states routinely execute people
with similar (or more severe) functional impairments.276  Or,
when the Court considers the ability of juveniles to transform
their lives and become productive members of society, the con-
cept of equal dignity might call for consideration of whether the
same logic compels the Court to reckon with the ability of
adults who are drug-addicted or severely mentally ill, for exam-
ple, to change over time as their conditions change.  The point
is not that these inequalities suggest an Equal Protection
Clause violation, but rather that the flexibility to observe these
inequities is not irrelevant to the question of whether a broad
punishment practice violates the Constitution.
The import of these observations coupled with our evalua-
tion in Part II of the continuing trajectory of the Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine under the emerging constitutional liberty
principle has significance for the future of criminal justice in
America.  Part IV assesses the future of the Eighth Amendment
and the impact of constitutional liberty on contemporary is-
sues in criminal law and procedure.
IV
LOOKING AHEAD: LIBERTY AND THE MODERNIZATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
This Part turns to consider both the possibilities and limi-
tations of Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty.  To that
end, in subpart A we sketch the near-term trajectory of consti-
tutional liberty on three contemporary—and critical—areas of
criminal justice: life without parole for juvenile homicide of-
fenders, life without parole for non-violent drug offenders, and
the death penalty.  In mapping a trajectory of the Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, our goal is not to predict the out-
come of any particular challenge to a punishment practice, or
even to argue that any particular practice is unconstitutional.
Rather, our goal is simply to show where the Court’s recent
Eighth Amendment doctrinal moves could lead at a concrete
level.  In doing so, we aim to anticipate some of the practical
and doctrinal challenges that the Court may face as it contin-
ues to flesh out its burgeoning Eighth Amendment liberty
jurisprudence.
275 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
276 See CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUST., 2015 CHHIRJ
DEATH PENALTY REPORT [hereinafter CHHIRJ REPORT] (providing accounts of people
with functional impairments who were executed in 2015).
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Subsequently, in subpart B, we consider the future impli-
cations for—and potential limitations of—our exegesis, beyond
the doctrinal hubs discussed in subpart A.  First, we consider
the impact on the doctrine in cases where actual usage data is
skewed by the absence of a jury or judge finding because of, for
example, mandatory minimum sentences.  Second, we con-
sider how the doctrine might respond to a challenged punish-
ment practice, for instance the use of solitary confinement as a
punishment for juveniles, where decision makers do make dis-
cretionary choices, but those choices are neither neutral nor
transparent.  In the context of the solitary confinement discus-
sion, we wrestle with the thorny question of what the Court
should do when it has imperfect information about a punish-
ment practice.  On the one hand, the Court has an obligation to
curb retributive excess.  On the other hand, in relying on its
own judgment without strong confirmation from objective
markers of societal standards of decency, the Court risks get-
ting the calculation wrong—and, more fundamentally, damag-
ing is institutional credibility.
A. Reinventing the Eighth Amendment
1. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Homicide Offenders
The first area where Eighth Amendment constitutional lib-
erty potentially has an impact is life without parole for juvenile
homicide offenders.  Meet Taurus Buchanan.  Now nearly forty,
he is serving life without the possibility of parole for a single
punch that he threw as a sixteen-year-old boy during a street
fight.277  Earlier this year, the prosecutor who sent him to
prison said: “I think I went too far.  If the state of Louisiana lets
him out, I would fall on my knees and thank God.”278  Hillary
Clinton, too, recently apologized for using the term “super-
predator” to refer to child offenders back in the 1990s.279  De-
spite these apologies, though, the panic that swirled around
the nation—in the media, from the mouths of public intellectu-
als and politicians, in the minds of ordinary Americans—had a
considerable impact on sentencing laws.280  John Mills, Anna
Dorn, and Amelia Hritz have explained that concern over the
violence that the new breed of superpredator would unleash on
277 Corey G. Johnson & Ken Armstrong, This Boy’s Life, THE MARSHALL PRO-
JECT, (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/04/this-boy-
s-life#.cm0Dvp5Cp [https://perma.cc/G5B4-AXC7].
278 Id.
279 See Lachman, supra note 72.
280 See supra Part I.
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Americans led “forty-five states [to] adopt[ ] laws expanding the
jurisdiction of adult courts over juveniles, thereby expanding
the applicability of JLWOP.”281  Even as violent crime de-
creased in the 1990s, juvenile life without parole sentences
increased.282  The rhetoric—the moral panic—and not reality
drove the legislative response and its retributive overreach.283
Under the theory of constitutional liberty, and the rights-
protective role the Court is establishing for itself under the
Eighth Amendment, what result?  It turns out that the objec-
tive indicators of societal standards of decency illuminate the
rarity and geographic concentration of juvenile life without pa-
role sentences.  While only sixteen states bar life without the
possibility of parole sentences for juveniles who commit mur-
der (and thirty-five states permit this punishment), nine states
have abandoned the punishment in the past four years—a
striking number given that the net effect of these changes is to
reduce punishment, not taxes.284  In terms of actual usage of
the punishment, fourteen states that retain life without parole
for juveniles have five or fewer people serving the punishment
statewide,285 and in six of those states, no person is serving the
sentence.286  Five additional states have imposed either zero or
one life without parole sentences upon a juvenile since
281 MILLS ET. AL, supra note 56, at 4–5. But see John R. Mills et al., Juvenile
Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 560 (2016) (detailing legislative enactments and declining
usage of juvenile life without parole).
282 Mills, supra note 281, at 560 (noting the superpredator era “saw a marked R
increase in juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences, despite a drop after
1994 in homicides committed by juveniles.”); id. at 561 fig.1. (citing Easy Access
to the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980-2013, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2015), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezash
[https://perma.cc/V6NU-3C6A] (providing year over year data on homicides and
homicides by juvenile offenders)).
283 See supra subpart I.A.
284 MILLS, supra note 56, at 4–5 (detailing legislative enactments).  The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court held that juvenile life without parole violated their state
constitution. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E. 3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013).
Delaware enacted a law that provides juveniles serving life without parole the
right to petition for a sentence reduction. See An Act to Amend Title 11 of the
Delaware Code Relating to Criminal Sentences, 2013 Del. Laws 37 (2013).  Thus,
in practical effect, there is no life without parole left in Delaware.  The other seven
states eliminated the punishment outright through their respective state legisla-
tures. MILLS, supra note 56, at 4–5.
285 Mills, supra note 281, at 603–04 app. B (listing Idaho, Iowa, New Hamp- R
shire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah).
286 Id. (listing Indiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island).
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2011.287  This decreased usage exemplifies the extreme geo-
graphic isolation.  As scholars have recently noted, “[t]hree
counties, which represent 4.1% of the U.S. population, are re-
sponsible for over twenty percent of all sentences.”288
As we have noted throughout this Article, these factors
matter because they create a strong inference that life without
parole does not meaningfully contribute to legitimate retribu-
tive demand.289  This is because if life without parole did serve
a legitimate retributive function then we would expect that the
punishment would be used routinely instead of rarely, and
broadly instead of in isolated instances.
Further, a closer look at the relationship between the pun-
ishment and the goal of retribution reveals deep conflict.  First,
children under eighteen possess diminished culpability relative
to a typically-developed adult.290  Juveniles “struggle to define
their identity,” possess a “susceptibility” to “immature and irre-
sponsible behavior,” and have a “vulnerability and comparative
lack of control over their immediate surroundings.”291  Given
that life without parole is the second harshest punishment
available under law,292 the unmistakable severity of the sen-
tence relative to the diminished moral culpability of juveniles
helps to explain why, as the moral panic over super-predators
fizzled, most of the nation walked away from the punishment.
Another reason why juvenile life without parole raises seri-
ous questions about its retributive excess is because people
change, often dramatically.293  Last term, in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reiterated
that a sentence of life without parole is extravagant for all but
“the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable cor-
ruption.”294  So, the only time where a life without parole sen-
287 Id. at 575 n.233 (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, and
Minnesota).
288 Id. at 571; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole: For Juveniles, 5
Tough Counties, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 22 2015), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/22/life-without-parole-for-juveniles-5-
tough-counties#.jypg2S9q1 [https://perma.cc/VK8P-4PY2] (discussing sentenc-
ing inequities between counties).
289 See supra Parts I & II.
290 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
291 Id. at 570.
292 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
293 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“Juveniles are more capable
of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of
‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.” (quoting Roper,
543 U.S. at 570)).
294 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
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tence is retributively justified is in the case of a juvenile who is
irreparably corrupt.  But how is it possible to know whether a
thirteen-year-old child is irreparably corrupt?  The best time to
make that determination is years—or even decades—after the
offense when the decision can be made on the basis of lived
experience.  Thus, life without parole appears to be excessive,
in part, because it denies the hope of redemption. As Justice
Kennedy articulated in Graham v. Florida:
[Life without parole] deprives the convict of the most basic
liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps
by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does
not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.  As one court
observed in overturning a life without parole sentence for a
juvenile defendant, this sentence “means denial of hope; it
means that good behavior and character improvement are
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in
store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days.”295
2. Life Without Parole for Nonviolent Drug Offenders
We see similar patterns of moral panic, legislative reaction,
and consequent retributive overreach in the category of life
without parole for non-violent drug offenders.  As we discussed
in Part I, the moral panic surrounding drug use in the 1980s
and 1990s was high.296  Former Republican House Speaker
Newt Gingrich recently stated, “I was hardcore on the issue of
crime . . . [t]here were tremendous unintended consequences.
Locking up people for very minor drug offenses destroyed their
future.”297  As Professors Bidish Sarma and Sophie Cull have
explained, like Gingrich, many Americans were “hardcore” on
the issue of drug crime; and, similar to juvenile life without
parole, most of the state and federal laws that resulted in life
without parole for drug offenses were enacted during a moral
panic.298  At the time, the public ranked crime as the number
295 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70 (2010) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P. 2d
944 (Nev. 1989) (citation and alterations omitted)).
296 Supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text (describing the fear regarding
the crack-cocaine epidemic).
297 Steven Rosenfeld, Will the Strange Bedfellow Team of Van Jones and Newt
Gingrich Push Congress to Reverse Decades of Criminal Justice and Prison Policy?,
ALTERNET (Jun. 7, 2015), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/will-strange-
bedfellow-team-van-jones-and-newt-gingrich-push-congress-reverse [http://
perma.cc/CR95-UMAW].
298 See Bidish Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consen-
sus Against Life Without Parole Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 66 CASE W.L.
REV. 525, 540–543 (2015).  In 1984, Congress passed a law that eliminated parole
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 61 17-JAN-17 12:39
2017] CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 473
one issue in America.299  The hysteria centered on the percep-
tion that drugs and violence were deeply interconnected.300
As it turns out, as in the case of juvenile life without parole
for homicide offenses, the perception on the interrelatedness of
drugs and violence, albeit popular, does not enjoy the advan-
tage of veracity.301  Again, panic, not reality, drove the retribu-
tive overreach.  Recognizing this fact, Senators Ted Cruz (R)
and Corey Booker (D), among others, have introduced the
Smarter Sentencing Act, which would eliminate in practice life
without parole for non-violent drug offense prospectively by
creating a safety valve through which judges could reduce life
sentences.302  That legislation, which enjoys broad bipartisan
support (though not the support of the committee chair), is still
pending as of September 2016.303  Meanwhile, two-thirds of
state legislatures have reduced the punishments for various
drug offenses,304 a fact that captures the broad societal under-
for people serving a life sentence. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2019, 2069 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).  New or expanded federal laws came in ‘86, ’87, and ‘94.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: Principal Fea-
tures, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/working-group-reports/
simplification/simplification-draft-paper-2 [https://perma.cc/4KAL-AR4Y].
299 See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRITICAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ISSUES: TASK FORCE REPORTS FROM THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY TO
ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO vii (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
158837.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3BJ-AG6J]; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans
Perceive Increased Crime in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/123644/americans-perceive-increased-crime.aspx [https://perma.cc/PJ8L-
9P7C] (reporting on polling data showing respondents believed crime is
increasing).
300 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008) (“As suggested by its
title, the Armed Career Criminal Act focuses upon the special danger created
when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—pos-
sesses a gun.”); see also Roper Ctr. for Pub. Op. Research, What Accounts for High
Rates of Crime?, THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, June/July 1997, at 14 (1997), https://
ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/84/84014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B6HQ-Y3K9]  (showing a majority of poll respondents in 1989 and 1990
believed drugs were the leading cause of crime).
301 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227,
227 (2015) (explaining that there is no “causal connection between drugs and
violence” that appears in “historical arrest data, current research, or independent
empirical evidence”).
302 See 161 Cong. Rec. S. 1576, 1577 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2015) (statement of
Sen. Lee); see also id. at 1578 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (detailing how this
legislation would reduce, but not eliminate, a number of the mandatory minimum
sentences and also provide remedies for people sentenced under the old 100:1
powder-crack regime).
303 See S. 502: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s502 [https://perma.cc/3EKU-BBX2].
304 See generally Ram Subramanian & Rebecka Moreno, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
DRUG WAR DE’TENTE? A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL DRUG LAW REFORM, 2009–2013 5–23
(2014) (surveying state legislation changing drug laws).  For example, in
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 62 17-JAN-17 12:39
474 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:413
standing of drug-war overreach and the subsequent  energy
and success around measures enacted to reduce the severity of
punishment.
All told, twenty-two states and the federal government au-
thorize life without parole for non-violent drug offenses.305  But
the real indicator of abandonment, as explained in Graham, is
the sheer disuse of the punishment practice.306  As a conserva-
tive estimate, there are over 1.5 million arrests for drug crimes
in the United States each year.307  Thus, over the course of
16.4 years (the median number of years served by a person
currently serving life without parole for a non-violent of-
fense308), nearly twenty-five million people were arrested for
drug crimes.  Meanwhile, in the entire country, there are ap-
proximately 2,500 people serving life without parole for a non-
violent drug crime.309  Hence, the rarity of the sanction reflects
strongly the improbability that permanent imprisonment as a
punishment practice meaningfully serves a retributive pur-
pose.  These comparatively few sentences are highly concen-
trated at the state level.  While approximately 80% of life
without parole sentences for non-violent drug offenses occur at
the federal level, there are people serving life without parole for
drug offenses in as few as eight and as many as eleven
states.310
Oklahoma, the Republican governor recently signed into law a bill that reduces
the severity of mandatory life without parole for a third non-violent drug posses-
sion (called trafficking) offense. See Justice Safety Valve Act, 2015 Okla. Sess.
Laws 243.
305 Sarma & Cull, supra note 298, at 561; see also JENNIFER TURNER & WILL
BUNTING, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVI-
OLENT OFFENSES 23 fig.3 (2013) (displaying a map of the states that authorize life
without parole for non-violent offenses).
306 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2010) (explaining the extreme
rarity of juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses relative to the
availability of the punishment); see also supra notes 195–205 and accompanying
text (describing the Court’s emphasis on actual sentences usage for curbing re-
tributive excess).
307 See Crime, Arrests, and US Law Enforcement, DRUGWARFACTS.ORG, http://
www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Crime#sthash.qqM6xBdC.dpbs [https://perma.cc/
5RGZ-5FWH] (reporting annual drug arrests range from 1,501,043–1,841,182
between 2007 and 2014); Drugs and Crime Facts, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z429-E8HZ]
(reporting approximately 1,841,200 drug arrests in 2007).
308 TURNER & BUNTING, supra note 305, at 26. R
309 Id. at 23 tbl.3.
310 Id. (listing Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina.  It is possible that there are people serving life
without parole in Delaware, Nevada or Virginia, but the Departments of Correc-
tions in those locations did not respond adequately to public records requests).
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3. The Death Penalty
A third punishment regime that could be implicated by the
Court’s emerging approach to the Eighth Amendment is the
death penalty.  After the Court invalidated then-existing capital
punishment statutes in 1972 in Furman,311 thirty-five legisla-
tures across the country enacted new death penalty regimes
with impressive speed and ferocity.312  The American Law Insti-
tute drafted a model statute that served as the dominant inspi-
ration for modern capital punishment statutes.313  In Gregg,
the Court considered these developments “[t]he most marked
indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for
murder.”314
It is important to note the timing of the Furman decision
when trying to understand this backlash. Furman came one
year after the Court’s decision mandating bussing,315 and a
year prior to its decision in Roe v. Wade, declaring a woman’s
right to an abortion.316  Facilitated by Furman, the death pen-
alty became the mechanism for a proxy war on deep racial,317
cultural,318 and federalism concerns.319  In this way then, the
trajectory of capital punishment resembles the aftermath of a
moral panic.  Significant societal anger and fear translated into
legislative (re)enactment of the death penalty. Yet, even in its
heyday in the 1990s, Americans never truly used the death
penalty regularly.  Indeed, at its peak, Americans only sen-
Missouri used to be on this list, but the Governor granted the last person serving
life without parole clemency in 2015.
311 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
312 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80, 179 n.23 (1976) (listing the
states and explaining that the American people had spoken as to the desirability
of the death penalty).
313 Id. at 191 (describing the model penal code statute upon which the Georgia
statute was modeled).
314 Id. at 179.
315 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1971).
316 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
317 See Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and Support for
the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 202, 205 (1994) (report-
ing on results of empirical study that show “[w]hite support for the death penalty
is . . . associated with antipathy to Blacks and racial stereotyping”).
318 See Lauren Gambino, Democrats’ Divide on Death Penalty Emerges as a
Major Point of Difference, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2015 8:43 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/06/democrats-death-penalty-clinton-san
ders-omalley [https://perma.cc/XMT7-7QCG].
319 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (addressing deference
owed to state courts in post-conviction capital proceedings).
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tenced 300–350 people to death each year in a nation that
endures 10,000 to 15,000 annual homicides.320
Today, nineteen states have formally abandoned the death
penalty through legislation (seventeen states) or judicial deci-
sion (two states).321  As with juvenile life without parole, under
the old mode of detecting consensus, the fact that thirty-one
states and the federal government authorize the punishment
would be fatal to any Eighth Amendment challenge.  But under
the more functional assessment that the Court has begun to
employ to legislative trends, actual usage and geographic isola-
tion render the death penalty constitutionally suspect.
Since 2007, seven states have formally eliminated capital
punishment.322  No state that previously prohibited capital
punishment has enacted it in over twenty years.  Governors in
Oregon, Colorado, Washington and Pennsylvania have used
their executive discretion to bar executions while they remain
in office.  Oregon counted on the abolitionist “side of the ledger”
in Hall v. Florida because the state had “suspended the death
penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40
years.”323  Meanwhile, similar to Oregon, Colorado has exe-
cuted only one person since Gregg.324  Washington has exe-
cuted only five people in that time.  And Pennsylvania has
executed only three people—all volunteers.325  Other states ex-
hibit similar types of long-term disuse, though without formal
moratoria.  For example, eleven states plus the federal govern-
ment performed five or fewer executions since Gregg,326 includ-
ing two states that have not executed anyone.327  Justice
320 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.4
(2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/ta
bles/table-4 [https://perma.cc/AG5T-XQZU].
321 See Facts About the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr. (July 15, 2016)
(listing states); 31 States with the Death Penalty and 19 States with Death Penalty
Bans, PROCON.ORG (Aug. 9, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://deathpenalty.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=001172 [https://perma.cc/YV9M-ELCE].
322 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  New Jersey (2007), New
York (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland
(2013), and Nebraska (2015).
323 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).
324 FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 321. R
325 Id.; see also Pennsylvania, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://deathpenalty
info.org/pennsylvania-1#sent [https://perma.cc/LU42-AYEQ] (noting that Penn-
sylvania’s three post-Gregg executions “have all been volunteers with serious
mental health issues, whom courts found to have waived their rights to an ap-
peals process”).
326 FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 321. R
327 See Executions by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5741 [https://perma.cc/KZY7-595A] (Kansas
and New Hampshire).
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Breyer counted thirty-nine states overall that exhibit long-term
disuse or else have formally eliminated the death penalty.328
Moreover, both death sentences and executions have de-
clined sharply over the past twenty years.  In 2015, only forty-
nine new death sentences were imposed nationally, an all-time
post-Furman low.329  In Texas, the number of death sentences
fell from forty-eight in 1999 to nine in 2013 to two in 2015.
Dramatic declines hit the Deep South as a whole.  Indeed, over
the past decades, death sentence and execution averages dip-
ped significantly below the levels of the decade before Furman,
causing Justice White to conclude that when, as it had in
1972, “imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of
infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general
need for retribution would be measurably satisfied.”330  Moreo-
ver, in terms of geographic isolation, in Glossip, Justice Breyer
emphasized that “the number of active death penalty counties
is small and getting smaller.”331  Since 2010, Breyer noted,
“only 15 counties imposed five or more death sentences.”332
Thus, examined at the more granular level that has
marked the Court’s recent Eighth Amendment cases, over 3000
counties no longer use the death penalty while only 15 counties
nationally averaged at least one death sentence per year.333
When viewed together with the reality that 31 states either
formally eliminated the death penalty or else have performed
less than one execution per decade since Gregg, it becomes
difficult to argue that the death penalty meaningfully contrib-
utes to a need for retribution.
If one shifts the lens from societal standards to the reality
of the death penalty in practice, the relationship between capi-
tal punishment and retribution is murkier still.  The typical
person who commits a murder is not, according to the Court,
eligible for a death sentence.334  To be death-eligible, a person
328 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773 (2015) (counting nineteen aboli-
tionist states, eleven states that retain the death penalty but have not executed
anyone since 2006, and nine states that have conducted fewer than five execu-
tions since 2006, which makes “an execution in those states a fairly rare event”).
329 Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR. (2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-
sentences-united-states-1977-2008 [https://perma.cc/A9G6-C59H] [hereinafter
Death Sentences in the U.S.].
330 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 311 (White, J., concurring).
331 Glossip, 135 S. Ct., at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (explaining that “[i]f the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme
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must possess sufficient moral culpability; i.e. more than that of
the typically developing adult.  Additionally, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of juveniles
(more impulsive, less formed identity, susceptible to external
influence from peers, etc.)335 and the intellectually disabled
(“cognitive and behavioral impairments” that include “the di-
minished ability to understand and process information, to
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to
control impulses”) due to their significantly diminished moral
culpabilities.336  Indeed, as the Court reiterated in Hall, “to
impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually dis-
abled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human
being.”337  In other words, the punishment of death is so retrib-
utively askew that its imposition would violate the inherent
dignity that government must preserve even when the offender
committed a serious crime.
Unfortunately, putting a wall around juveniles and the in-
tellectually disabled has not solved the problem of executing
people with crippling impairments.  In 2015 alone roughly 75%
of executions involved a concern over retributive excess due to
intellectual impairments, brain damage, severe mental illness,
and other similarly serious impairments.338  Consider one ex-
ample: Georgia executed Andrew Brannan, a decorated Viet-
nam combat veteran who had been diagnosed with both post-
traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder.  His symptoms
included depression, hypomania, flashbacks, recurrent in-
tense anxiety, and paranoia.339  His “total occupation and so-
cial impairment” led the Department of Veteran Affairs to
categorize him as 100% disabled.340
Finally, the death penalty eliminates both any hope of
transformation and any reason to believe that the prisoner has
intrinsic value.  But the reality is that even people on death row
sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution”).
335 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (barring the death penalty
for juvenile offenders).
336 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (barring the death penalty for intellectually dis-
abled offenders).
337 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
338 CHHIRJ REPORT, supra note 276 (describing the credible mitigation evi- R
dence for each execution in 2015).
339 Franklin J. Bordenave & D. Clay Kelly, The Death Penalty and Mentally Ill
Defendants, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 284, 285 (2010).
340 Taylor Barnes, A Vietnam Veteran with PTSD is the First US Execution of
2015, INTERCEPT (Jan. 14, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/01/14/vietnam
-veteran-ptsd-first-us-execution-2015/ [https://perma.cc/LB3T-V2P9].
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change.  Consider, as one recent example, Kelly Gissendaner, a
woman who, while in prison awaiting execution, had mentored
despondent prisoners, many of who then became productive
members of society when released, including women who are
now social workers and literacy teachers.  “Kelly is the poster
child for redemption,” one of those women said.  “Killing Kelly is
essentially killing hope.”341
When executing people with marked functional impair-
ments or the demonstrated capacity to change becomes the
rule, not the exception, an Obergefell-esque concern over equal
dignity emerges to cast further doubt on the retributive neces-
sity of the capital punishment enterprise as a whole.
***
As this subpart illustrates, once the strands of a more
robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence are identified, three
harsh punishment practices become vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack, even in a short-term view of the doctrine’s trajec-
tory.  By envisioning in concrete terms the contours of potential
Eighth Amendment challenges under the newly robust categor-
ical exemption approach, a few important facts emerge.  First,
plausibly excessive punishments tend to be geographically iso-
lated at the state and county level.  These sanctions also tend
to be used very rarely relative to their availability.  Taken to-
gether, these insights provide a critical rebuff to those scholars
who envision that departure from the “modes of punishment”
or “contrary to longstanding practice” approaches would result
in a hopelessly subjective enterprise too sensitive to momen-
tary trends in opinion.342  While these critiques have merit
under a wooden approach that simply counts state legisla-
tures, the same arguments lose much of their force under the
Court’s more robust look into societal standards of decency,
including, importantly, evidence of how, where, when, and how
often local actors use their discretion to seek and impose the
challenged punishment practice.
341 Former Inmates Plead for Clemency for Kelly Gissendaner, Who Gave Them
Hope in Prison, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6254
[https://perma.cc/4M2J-JWGP].
342 See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 3, at 554–55 (noting the problem of inter-
preting standards of decency based upon consensus over decades as opposed to
centuries).
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B. Tensions and Possible Limitations
In this subpart, we briefly outline the possible tensions for,
and limitations of, Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty.
The chief uncertainty that remains centers on how the Court
detects retributive excess.  To preview those tensions, we first
query what happens when actual sentencing data, which thus
far has relied heavily on the joint discretion of prosecutors and
jurors, is unavailable due to mandatory minimum sentences
that remove discretion from juries and judges.  Second, using
the context of solitary confinement, an area where Justice Ken-
nedy has showed express interest, we explore how the doctrine
should react to usage data that is obscured both by a lack of
participation by neutral parties like judges or juries and a fun-
damental lack of transparency.  These decisions are made, lit-
erally, behind the prison walls.  Relatedly, and finally, this
section hypothesizes insufficient information to detect societal
consensus with certainty and describes some advantages and
disadvantages of the Court invalidating a punishment practice
with a heavier reliance on its own judgment that the punish-
ment is excessive or through the consultation of a broader set
of indicators, such as the markers of democratic discourse that
the Court consulted in Obergefell.
1. When the Typical Usage Indicators Are Unavailable:
Mandatory Minimum Sentences
One of the most promising doctrinal developments in the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been the move to a more
functional assessment of societal standards of decency.  Spe-
cifically, the move from a focus on bean counting legislative
enactments to a focus on the actual usage of a punishment
permits a more fine-tuned understanding of decency because it
involves not abstract policy considerations, but rather real
cases with real facts decided by local jurors or judges.  One
tension of the categorical exemption framework, however, is
that many different crimes carry mandatory minimum
sentences of varying degrees, which skews the assessment of
decency that comes from on-the-ground discretionary deci-
sions in individual cases.343
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits automatic life without parole sentences
for juveniles who commit homicide offenses.344  Thus, a juve-
343 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474–75 (2012).
344 Id. at 2475.
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nile homicide offender has the right to present evidence that
suggests that he is not “irreparably corrupt[ ]” and therefore
suggests that a life without parole sentence would be excessive
in his case.345 Miller could be interpreted as an instance where
the Court, and Justice Kennedy in particular, embraced proce-
dural regulation.  After all, in practice, it requires jurors or
judges to make additional findings.  However, in Montgomery,
ostensibly a case about retroactivity, Justice Kennedy’s opin-
ion for the Court put a substantive gloss on the Miller rule:
Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile of-
fender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,’ it ren-
dered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a
class of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth.346
In sum, then, at least in dicta, Justice Kennedy’s gloss in Miller
places the case within the paradigm of the categorical exemp-
tions cases.
If the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence becomes more ro-
bust, the Court likely will need to engage in this line drawing
exercise between mandatory sentences and use of the sentence
in all instances more regularly.  By way of preview, the Iowa
Supreme Court recently decided in State v. Lyle that under the
Iowa state constitution, juveniles cannot be subjected to
mandatory minimum sentences at all.347  Moreover, in a recent
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, an
Alabama man asserts that mandatory life imprisonment is an
excessive punishment for non-violent crimes involving the per-
sonal use of marijuana.348  One, too, could imagine challenges
to mandatory life without parole for adults who commit serious
non-homicide crimes or even for felony murder.  It is true that
the typical juvenile has both a diminished moral capacity and a
great capacity for change.  But the reality is that most people
can change, and many of them profoundly so.  This is particu-
larly the case, perhaps even more so, for offenders who suffer
345 Id. at 2469.
346 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2469, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)) (internal citations
omitted).
347 State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Iowa 2014).
348 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–12, Brooker v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct.
1659 (2016).  Brooker lived with his son in Houston County, and court documents
show police found a marijuana-growing operation there during a search in 2011.
The elderly man was convicted of drug trafficking, and a judge sentenced him to
life without parole because of past robbery convictions in Florida. Id. at 6–8.
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from untreated mental illness and addiction.  The short of it is
that the Court will need to address how and where to draw
lines around mandatory sentences.
One sensible solution would be for the Court to use its own
independent judgment to glean whether the punishment prac-
tice is excessive.  If the question proves debatable, but not re-
solvable, then the invalidation of mandatory minimum
sentences that involve the challenged punishment practice
would facilitate an important infusion of usage information
that the Court could use to help it glean the standards of de-
cency for a future case as to the challenged practice as a whole.
Another solution is to only invalidate mandatory minimum
sentences in circumstances where a strong legislative consen-
sus has emerged against the practice.  But this wooden ap-
proach suffers from the same problems that legislative bean
counting always suffers—harsh laws, infrequently enacted
during moments of moral panic, do not account adequately for
real defendants in real cases.  The result, not infrequently, is
retributive extravagance.  Thus, with mandatory minimum
sentences the question is when does the mandatory nature of
the sentence so risk disproportionality that the Court should
intervene to require individualization, so as to reduce the risk
of retail level over-punishment and begin the process of gaining
more reliable on-the-ground consensus indicators as the ex-
cessiveness of the punishment as a whole.  But what happens
when there is no jury or judge to empower?  That’s the question
we take up in the next subsection.
2. When the Typical Usage Indicators Are Inapplicable:
Solitary Confinement
When a judge sentences a person to prison the inclusion of
long-term solitary confinement is not a part of that sentence.349
Nonetheless, the cruel and unusual punishments clause ap-
plies to a prisoner placed in an “isolation cell.”350  Indeed,
Judge Alex Kozinski, the Chief Judge of the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has called solitary confinement
349 Solitary confinement is a disciplinary measure administered by prison au-
thorities and not the courts. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972) (“[P]rison officials must
have large discretion in making . . . determinations, and . . . courts should retain
their traditional reluctance to interfere with disciplinary matters properly under
the control of state prison authorities.”).
350 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
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“the most severe punishment” and “worse than death.”351  Last
year, Justice Kennedy wrote in a separate concurring opinion
that because “years on end of near-total isolation exact a terri-
ble price . . . the judiciary may be required” to place limits on
the use of solitary confinement.352  But how could the Court,
using its consensus analysis, determine whether solitary con-
finement is an extravagant punishment when it is applied, for
instance, as a means of punishing minor prison infractions or
when it is imposed upon juveniles or the mentally ill (a practice
that one federal court called “the mental equivalent of putting
an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe”353)?
The question would be easy if this were a practice like
mandatory juvenile life without parole for a homicide offense.
The Court could do as it did in Miller and require individualized
sentencing.354  In turn, the individualized sentencing would
provide data over time into whether the punishment of life
without parole generally is unconstitutionally harsh.  But there
is no jury or judge making these decisions in the context of
solitary confinement.
One option is to treat the prison guards who make the
decisions to impose solitary confinement as the relevant indica-
tor of consensus, and query how unusual the practice is across
America.  The problem with that approach, however, is that
while jurors and judges are neutral parties, prison guards are
not.  Indeed, a prison guard or warden deciding whether to
impose solitary confinement as a punitive measure is akin to a
prosecutor taking over sentencing for the judge or jury.
Second, the Court might decide to inject a local, transpar-
ent, neutral decision maker before a prolonged stint of isolation
is imposed.  For instance, for any use of solitary confinement
over thirty days, the Court might require the states to craft a
meaningful process that enables both transparency and a role
for neutral observers to be included in the processes.  If this
injection of local, transparent decision makers results in very
few instances of prolonged isolation for juveniles or the men-
tally ill, then the Court would learn over time about the societal
351 Alex Kozinski, Worse Than Death, 125 YALE L.J.F. 230, 230 (2016) (arguing
against the excessive use of solitary confinement in American prisons).
352 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
353 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
354 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (“That correspondence—
Graham’s ‘[t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punish-
ment’—makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individu-
alized sentencing when imposing the death penalty.” (quoting Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 89 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment))).
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norms on the punitive use of prolonged solitary confinement.
But the downside of this approach is that it would take the
Court back down the path where its institutional competence is
at its nadir.
A third option, which finds expression in Obergefell, is
turning to a broader range of democratic discourse to glean
retributive excess.355  These broader range of materials in-
clude, for example, “referenda, legislative debates, and grass-
roots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers,
books, . . . other popular and scholarly writings,” and the
knowledge gleaned from “extensive litigation in state and fed-
eral courts.”356  Resolving which approach is best is beyond the
scope of this Article.  However, this is but one example of a
scenario where under a more robust Eighth Amendment the
Court will need to refine its current understanding of the tools
available to gauge contemporary standards of decency.
Here, then, it is wise to sound caution at the notion that
the Court should move forward based on a broader range of
democratic discourse, though without objective indicia that at
least mimic the richness of the outcomes of jury trials or judge
sentencing.  If the Court invalidates a punishment practice
without the benefit of that more robust usage data, the likeli-
hood increases that the Court miscalculates in its determina-
tion that a punishment serves no legitimate purpose.  If it
calculates poorly, there is a risk of creating a backlash that
triggers a federal constitutional amendment (perhaps this is
not realistic in the context of solitary confinement, but change
the factual hypothesis to the context of sex offender registries
and the probabilities shift).  Moreover, even without the risk of
error or backlash, the Court expends some of its institutional
credibility when it invalidates a punishment that people notice
is missing from the set of democratic tools, even if those pun-
ishments are marginally excessive.
As Justice Kennedy said in the wake of Obergefell, “when
we have a controversial case—and a very difficult case like
[same-sex marriage]—we draw down on a capital of trust, a
deposit of trust, and we have to rebuild that capital.  We have to
put new deposits, new substance into this reservoir of
trust.”357  A robust set of usage indicators, including sentenc-
355 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
356 Id.
357 Robert Barnes, The Supreme Court: Too Liberal?, WASH. POST, (July 26,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-supreme-
court-too-liberal/2015/07/26/5e31c988-320f-11e5-8353-
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ing practices and geographic isolation, significantly limit the
capital drawn from the trust.  When those indicators are miss-
ing, however, it becomes a more difficult balancing act on the
margins—an independent judicial belief that a punishment
practice is excessive versus the risk of taking a legitimate tool
out of circulation or damaging the credibility of the Court.  A
practice such as prolonged solitary confinement, especially as
it is used for punishment of minor infractions or imposed upon
juveniles or the mentally ill, is so extreme and our medical
literature so robust that the downside risks seem to pale in
comparison to the known excess.  But this might not be the
case with future challenges to a punishment practice; and, in
those instances, there is a serious tension in the jurisprudence
ahead for the Court to resolve.  Sounding a warning is not the
same thing as deciding a question though, and we leave it to
future scholarship to parse out these nuances in more depth.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the conventional understand-
ing of the scope of Eighth Amendment protections against cruel
and unusual punishment is too limited.  The moral panics of
the 1980s and 90s, including, for example, the crack-baby and
super-predator scares, provide startling contemporary exam-
ples of why the authors of the Eighth Amendment sought to
remove the question of excess punishment—when a punish-
ment serves no legitimate purpose that a lesser sanction could
not fulfill—from the rough and tumble of majoritarian politics.
Fortunately, though the U.S. Supreme Court has long been
derelict in its duty to fulfill this critical function, the justices
have begun to shape the nuances of the doctrine in a way that
could foretell a far more robust jurisprudence.  Specifically, the
Court has begun to use its categorical exemption framework to
bar excessive punishments as they relate to categories of of-
fenses or classes of offenders.  Within that framework, the
Court has been especially focused on preventing retributive
excess (as opposed to arbitrariness or discrimination among
those offenders otherwise eligible for the punishment).  And, in
the effort to squelch retributive excess, the Court has created a
more sophisticated analysis for assessing whether there is a
societal consensus that reflects the excessiveness of the sanc-
tion.  The hallmark of this more robust approach is an in-
1215475949f4_story.html [https://perma.cc/R4WC-TMU5] (alterations in
original).
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creased importance on where and how often the punishment is
used in practice.  Taken together, these doctrinal changes—
combined with a clearer theoretical purpose and jurispruden-
tial approach—are the seeds of a more robust role for the Court
in protecting citizens against excessive punishment.
